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The
Hidden
Life
of
Consumer
Bankruptcy Reform: Danger Signs for
the New U.S. Law From Unexpected
Parallels in the Netherlands
Jason J. Kilborn*
Every self-respecting person will surely exert himself
to the utmost to repay debts in full whenever contracted.
At the same time, it seems sensible-indeed pedagogically responsible1
not to pursue people their whole lives for debts.
ABSTRACT

This Article offers a unique perspective on the heavily
revised U.S. consumer bankruptcy law, which went effect on
October 17,2005, in light of a surprising discovery: It turns out
that the U.S. consumer bankruptcy system as "reformed"
resembles in many critical respects the consumer bankruptcy
system in place for the past six years in the Netherlands. As a
result of this serendipitous U.S.-Dutch convergence, years of
experience under the Dutch consumer debt relief system can
provide a rare glimpse into the future of the new U.S. system.
The Dutch law in practice has diverged in significant ways from
legislative expectations, and such divergences might well be
repeated-for better or worse-in the United States.
In
particular, comparisons between the Dutch and U.S. systems
reveal latent weaknesses and portend an impending breakdown
in the "credit counseling" and "means testing" parts of our new
system. A comparative view of recent Dutch developments offers
not only cause for concern, however, but also hope for some
effective solutions.

* Louisana State University Law Center. The Author would like to thank Jean
Braucher, Adam Feibelman, Melissa Jacoby, Nick Huls, Nathalie Martin, Christoph
Paulus, Jay Westbrook, and Bill Whitford for their support and comments on this
Article, and Chancellor John Costonis for his generous summer research assistance.
1.
Handelingen II 1994/95, nr. 99, p. 6075 (comments of Rep. Van der Vlies,
member of the Second Chamber). For a good discussion of the powers of the First and
Second Chambers and the legislative structure and process in the Netherlands, see
INTRODUCTION TO DUTCH LAW 300, 302-13 (J.M.J. Chorus et al. eds., 3rd rev. ed.,
1999).
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In U.S. legal discourse, the notions of "legal transplants" and
"globalization" more often than not seem to refer to the one-way
dissemination of U.S. norms to other countries. 2 Seldom does one see
any discussion of U.S. importation of foreign legal ideas. Indeed,
most lawmakers in the United States seem generally hostile to
foreign influences on U.S. law.3 Nonetheless, it turns out that one of
the most significant modern U.S. legal reforms has imported-quite
inadvertently 4-a
framework strikingly similar to that of one
particular foreign legal system.
This Article takes advantage of a rare double opportunity to
break new ground in commercial, consumer, and comparative law.
First, it offers one of the first detailed analyses of key elements of a

2.
One recent article, for example, opens with the following sentence: "Since
the end of the Second World War, and particularly following the end of the Cold War,
the American legal system arguably has become the most influential legal system in
the world." M.ximo Langer, From Legal Transplants to Legal Translations: The
Globalization of Plea Bargaining and the Americanization Thesis in Criminal
Procedure, 45 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1, 1 (2004). This Article goes on to catalogue nearly two
dozen other articles and books praising, criticizing, or just describing the influence of
U.S. law on the laws and practices of other countries. See id. at 1-3 & nn. 1-17; see,
e.g., Brian R. Cheffins & Randall S. Thomas, The Globalization (Americanization?)of
Executive Pay, 1 BERKELEY Bus. L.J. 233 (2004); Richard C. Breeden, The
Globalizationof Law and Business in the 1990's, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 509 (1993).
3.
For example, conservative politicians are apoplectic about Supreme Court
Justice Anthony Kennedy's reference to foreign legal norms in his opinion invalidating
the juvenile death penalty. See Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 1198-1200 (2005);
see, e.g., id. at 1225-29 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Dana Milbank, And the Verdict on
Justice Kennedy Is: Guilty, WASH. POST, Apr. 9, 2005, at A3, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A38308-2005Apr8.html.
For
a
wonderfully lucid and insightful discussion of this issue, see Sarah H. Cleveland, Is
There Room for the World in Our Courts?, WASH. POST, Mar. 20, 2005, available at
http://www.utexas.edu/law/news/2005/032105_cleveland.html.
4.
In the legislative record of the new U.S. consumer bankruptcy reform law,
the Author found no reference whatsoever to any other developing system in Europe or
elsewhere. This is not altogether surprising, as few people in the United States are
aware of recent developments in Europe on this front, particularly in smaller countries
like the Netherlands, in part due to the dearth of information on these systems in
widely-available English-language sources. The Author has tried to improve this
situation by producing articles on each of the new European systems. See infra note 6.
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recent overhaul of U.S. consumer bankruptcy law, effective since
October 17, 2005.5 Undoubtedly, many analyses of the new reform
law will follow, but this Article offers a unique perspective in light of
a curious and surprising second discovery: it turns out that the new
U.S. consumer bankruptcy law represents globalization in a more
balanced sense. This Article reveals that Congress has in many
respects adopted the consumer bankruptcy system that has been in
place for the past six years in the Netherlands.6 Since the late 1800s,
the Netherlands and the United States have developed distinct but
surprisingly parallel responses to consumer financial distress. This
Article explores how the two systems have converged at the beginning
of the twenty-first century. To complete the globalization picture,
this Article also notes key similarities and differences between the
Dutch system and the new consumer debt relief systems in
neighboring European states, primarily Germany and France.
As a result of this serendipitous U.S.-Dutch convergence, years of
experience under the Dutch consumer debt relief system can act as a
sort of crystal ball, providing a rare glimpse into the future of the new
U.S. system. The Dutch law "on the ground" has diverged from
legislative expectations in significant ways, and such divergences
might well be repeated-for better or worse-in the United States in
coming years. In particular, comparison with Dutch experience
reveals latent weaknesses and portends an impending breakdown in
the credit counseling and "means testing" parts of our new system. In
particular, the new U.S. system will likely face serious challenges due
to mandatory participation by the financially troubled credit
counseling industry and due to mandatory payment plans that hold
some debtors to quite restrictive household budgets for five long
years. Credit counseling will likely delay but not avoid bankruptcy,
and many of those forced into payment plans face likely failure in
their steep climb out of financial distress. Luckily, a final parallel
with Dutch law suggests that enlightened application of judicial
discretion might assuage some of these concerns.
Part I situates the discussion by briefly noting the theoretical
similarities and fundamental differences between the bankruptcy
systems in the United States and the Netherlands from the late
1800s to 1979. Part II traces how the two systems began to converge
in 1979 by adopting parallel but essentially opposite systems of
consumer credit (debt) counseling. Finally, Part III describes how the
two systems have finally arrived on largely common ground. Part
III.A explores the development and early implementation of the new
Dutch consumer bankruptcy system, focusing on how the law has
actually applied in the real world of consumer financial distress. This

5.
6.

See infra text accompanying note 199.
See infra Part III.B.
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Part continues a larger project to chart recent developments in
consumer debt relief law in Europe. 7 Part III.B introduces several
key elements of the revised U.S. consumer bankruptcy system and
compares them with similar elements in the Netherlands. Drawing
on the preceding analysis of Dutch experience, this final Part paints a
fuller picture of what is likely to come-both good and bad-under
the new U.S. law.

I.

BANKRUPTCY IN THE UNITED STATES AND THE NETHERLANDS

BEFORE 1979
In both the United States and the Netherlands, a legal system of
bankruptcy has been available to consumers-that is, individuals not
engaged in entrepreneurial activity-since the late 1800s. The U.S.
Bankruptcy Act of 1898 arose, as several predecessor laws had, after
a period of speculation in securities that led to the financial collapse
of scores of individuals, some rather prominent.8
Although
consumerism and the great democratization of credit would not really
get underway until the early 1900s, 9 the stage was set early in the
United States for open access to a system of debt relief for all comers.
Moreover, the 1898 Act firmly established the principle that
bankruptcy in the United States would mean immediate and
unconditional elimination of prior indebtedness (discharge) and a
"fresh start" for debtors to begin a new economic life.1 0
Bankruptcy in the Netherlands, as in other European countries,
has always carried an entirely different meaning.
The Dutch
Bankruptcy Law (Faillissementswet)has been in force since 1896, and
like its U.S. analogue, it applies to individuals of all vocations,

7.
Jason Kilborn, The Innovative German Approach to Consumer Debt Relief:
Revolutionary Changes in German Law, and SurprisingLessons for the United States,
24 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 257, 269 (2004) [hereinafter, Kilborn, German Law]; Jason
Kilborn, La Responsabilisationde l'Economie: What the United States Can Learn From
the New French Law on Consumer Overindebtedness, 26 MICH. J. INT'L L. 619, 636
n.115 (2005) [hereinafter, Kilborn, French Law]; Jason Kilborn, Continuity, Change,
and Innovation in Emerging Consumer Bankruptcy Systems: Belgium and
Luxembourg, 14 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. (forthcoming spring 2006), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=690802 [hereinafter, Kilborn, Belgium and Luxemburg].
8.
See DAVID A SKEEL, JR. DEBT'S DOMINION: A HISTORY OF BANKRUPTCY LAW
IN AMERICA 24-28 (2001); BRUCE H. MANN, REPUBLIC OF DEBTORS: BANKRUPTCY IN THE
AGE OF AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE (2002).
9.
LENDOL CALDER, FINANCING THE AMERICAN DREAM: A CULTURAL HISTORY

124-203 (1999).
10.
Of course, some debts have always been excluded from the discharge, but
this sort of detail lies beyond the scope of this paper. For a brief discussion of the scope
of the "fresh start" offered by the 1898 Act and its four predecessors, see Jason J.
Kilborn, Mercy, Rehabilitation, and Quid Pro Quo: A Radical Reassessment of
Individual Bankruptcy, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 855, 859-61 (2003).
OF CONSUMER CREDIT
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eliminating a prior restriction to merchant debtors.11 To this day,
though, bankruptcy in the Netherlands offers not relief for debtors,
but a general collection device for creditors. 12 Dutch bankruptcy
proceedings conclude with unpaid creditors retaining their right to
pursue the debtor for life, seizing any property beyond the small
modicum of assets shielded as exempt from creditors' claims. 13 The
guiding principle is not the U.S. fresh start, but the old Roman
maxim pacta sunt servanda-contracts must be fulfilled.
Only
through a new agreement with creditors to replace the old defaulted
14
obligations could debtors escape lifelong liability.

II.

REFORM IN

1979

AND THE CHALLENGES OF THE
OF CONVERGENCE

1990s:

THE ORIGINS

The rise of consumerism and an expansion of credit to ordinary
consumers in the 1950s and 1960s placed great stress on both
nations' bankruptcy systems. As a result, the Netherlands and the
United States both enacted reforms in 1979. Although these reforms
took very different forms, the parallel in timing is striking. How
these two systems changed in 1979 would powerfully influence the
way they further developed toward the end of the century.
A. The U.S. Bankruptcy Code and the Rise and Fall of Credit
Counseling
No great economic crisis prompted the eventual overhaul of the
1898 U.S. Bankruptcy Act. 15 The structure of the Act, however,
proved ill-suited to the burgeoning bankruptcy practice in the United
States after World War II. As spending and borrowing expanded
rapidly among the new class of consumers, 16 members of this group
began to overwhelm the bankruptcy system. Annual bankruptcy
filings grew from about 10,000 in 1946 to over 200,000 in 1967, with

11.
Frits Hamminga, Netherlands: Insolvency Proceedings, in EUROPEAN
INSOLVENCY PRACTITIONERS' HANDBOOK 193-94 (Sir Kenneth Cork & G.A. Weiss eds.,
1984).
12.
Id. at 195-96.
13.
Id. at 195-96, 201; Kamerstukken II 1994/95, 22 969, nr.19, p. 24;
Handelingen II 1994/95, nr. 99, p. 6073.
14.
The Dutch law allows the court to impose a composition agreement on some
recalcitrant creditors, but only if supermajorities in number and amount of claims vote
in favor of a debtor-proposed settlement. See id. at p. 214.
15.
Indeed, the reform act of 1978 was the first U.S. bankruptcy law not
preceded by a major economic crisis or panic. Kenneth N. Klee, Legislative History of
the New Bankruptcy Law, 28 DE PAUL L. REV. 941, 942 (1979).
16.
CALDER, supra note 8, at 291-97; Nathalie Martin, The Role of History and
Culture in Developing Bankruptcy and Insolvency Systems: The Perils of Legal
Transplantation,28 BC. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 13-21 (2005).
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the consumer share of these filings rising from 84% to 92%. 17 This
avalanche of filings taxed the inefficient administrative structure of
the system, producing high administrative costs and delays. 18
1. The Bankruptcy Code and Chapters 7 and 13
Effective in October 1979,19 a largely structural reform of the
20
1898 Bankruptcy Act produced the current U.S. Bankruptcy Code.
The current code creates a bifurcated system of bankruptcy relief for
consumers in Chapter 7 and Chapter 13; the debtor chooses the
chapter under which relief is sought. Before the most recent reform
went into effect, about 70% of debtors filed under Chapter 7,
continuing the original U.S. fresh-start approach. This approach
immediately shields debtors from liability on most obligations
(discharge) in exchange for handing over their non-exempt property
21
to an appointed trustee for liquidation and distribution to creditors.
In the overwhelming majority of these cases, the trustee reports that
the debtor owns no property that may be lawfully seized; 22 the case
thus concludes with a discharge and fresh start after a total duration
of about four months.
The other 30% of U.S. debtors have chosen to enter into a threeto five-year repayment plan under Chapter 13, which discharges
debtors from their unpaid obligations only upon completion of the
payment plan.23 Debtors propose their own plans subject only to a
few general requirements. 24 The most notable requirement is that
the plan must dedicate to creditors all of the debtor's "disposable
income," which is vaguely defined as that income "not reasonably
necessary" for the debtor's household expenses. 25 Additionally, some
courts require at least a certain minimum payment to creditors to

17.
18.
19.
20.
17, 2005).
21.

H.R. Doc. No. 93-137, at 2 (1973).
See id. at 2-4.
Act of Nov. 6, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549, § 402(a) (1978).
11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1978), amended by Pub. L. No. 109-8 (effective Oct.
See id. §§ 521-22, 541-42, 701, 725-27 (1978), amended by Pub. L. No. 109-

8 (effective Oct. 17, 2005).

22.
See, e.g., Robert D. Martin, A Riposte to Klee, 71 AM. BANKR. L.J. 453, 456
n.14 (1997); Michelle J. White, PersonalBankruptcy Under the 1978 Bankruptcy Code:
An Economic Analysis, 63 IND. L.J. 1, 38 (1988).

23.
See 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a) (2005), substantially amended by Pub. L. No. 109-8,
effective Oct. 17, 2005. Some debtors may receive relief even if they do not complete
their payment plans, but the requirements for such "hardship discharges" are quite
strict. Id. § 1328(b).
24.
See id. §§ 1322(a), 1325, amended by Pub. L. No. 109-8 (effective Oct. 17,
2005).
25.
See id.. § 1325(b)(2). This will change for debtors with above-median income
for their state when the most recent reform is implemented on October 17, 2005. The
budgetary scheme of the law as revised is described below in Part III.B.2.b.
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establish the debtor's good faith. 26
The required minimum
dividend-or the lack of a required minimum-currently differs
27
significantly from district to district, even within the same state.
Only about one-third of Chapter 13 debtors manage successfully to
28
complete their payments and receive a discharge.
2. DMPs and Credit Counseling in Crisis
Before the most recent amendments to the Bankruptcy Code,
neither chapter required the debtor to attempt to negotiate an out-ofcourt payment plan with creditors. 29 Nonetheless, since the mid1960s, some consumer debtors have delayed or avoided entering the
bankruptcy system by attempting to negotiate alternate payment
arrangements with creditors with the help of private credit
30
counselors.
Ironically, credit counseling in the United States was initiated
not by welfare organizations, but by commercial banks. In response
to rising default rates and personal bankruptcy filings among their
consumer customers, banks funded the initial setup of a network of
credit counseling agencies throughout the United States beginning in
the 1950s. 31 Creditors sought to redirect consumers away from a

26.
See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(3) (1978).
27.
See, e.g., Jean Braucher, Lawyers and Consumer Bankruptcy: One Code,
Many Cultures, 67 AM. BANKR. L.J. 501, 532, 546-47, 550-51 (1993) (revealing that the
Bankruptcy Court in San Antonio, Texas, required plans to offer 100% payment, but in
Austin, TX, only 25-33%, in Cincinnati, OH, 70%, but in Dayton, Ohio, only 10%).
28.
Teresa A. Sullivan et al., Who Uses Chapter 13?, in CONSUMER
BANKRUPTCY IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 269, 273, 274-75, tbl. 1 (Johanna NiemiKiesilainen et al. eds., 2003).
29.
See infra Part III.B.1 for a discussion of the new credit counseling and
financial management training requirements.
Before the 2005 reform, Congress
similarly refused to require a Chapter 13 payment plan as a quid pro quo for relief for
debtors with significant future income. As this Author has argued before, the reasons
for Congress' action seem wholly unconvincing. See Kilborn, supra note 9, at 892-94.
The 2005 amendments will change this, too, although only for a small percentage of
debtors. See infra Part III.B.2.
30.
See infra note 31 and accompanying text for indepth discussion of credit
counseling.
31.
See, e.g., S. REP. No. 109-55, at 4, 34 (2005), available at <http://frwebgate.
access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/useftp.cgi?IPaddress=162. 140.64.88&flename=sr055.pdf&directory
=/diskb/wais/data/lO9congreports> [hereinafter ABUSIVE PRACTICES]; DEANNE LOONIN
& TRAVIS PLUNKETT, CREDIT COUNSELING IN CRISIS: THE IMPACT ON CONSUMERS OF
FUNDING CUTS, HIGHER FEES AND AGGRESSIVE NEW MARKET ENTRANTS 6 (Consumer
Fed'n of Am. & Nat'l Consumer Law Center eds., 2003), available at http://www.law.
upenn.edu/bll/ulcUCDC/cfa-nclcreport.pdf [hereinafter CREDIT COUNSELING IN CRISIS].

These non-profit counselors formed an umbrella organization in 1951 called the National
Foundation for Consumer Credit (NFCC) to coordinate counseling strategy and practices.
National Foundation for Credit Counseling Who We Are, http://www.nfcc.org/AbouiUs/
aboutus_01.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2005). Between the mid-1980s and mid-1990s, the
number of non-profit counseling offices expanded six-fold from 200 to more than 1,300
throughout the United States. See id. (reporting currently 1300 offices nationwide);

2006]

DUTCH AND US. CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY

quick discharge of debt in the bankruptcy system and toward
compromise repayment arrangements, called debt management plans
(DMPs).32
These DMPs generally call for 100% payment of
outstanding debt (excluding secured debt, like home mortgage and
33
car loans) over three to five years.
To encourage debtors to enter into such DMPs, creditors offer
reductions in accruing interest and late fees.
To encourage
counseling agencies to guide debtors into DMPs, creditors originally
offered the agencies so-called "fair share" payments of 12-15% of the
amounts paid by debtors to creditors through the DMPs.3 4 These fair
share payments represent the principal source of continuous funding
for credit counseling in the United States. As a result of this DMPfocused funding model, counselors have increasingly focused on
enrolling as many debtors as possible in DMPs that maximize
payments to creditors (and, consequently, payments to the counseling
agencies), rather than counseling debtors on the most suitable options
35
for relief.
Enormous growth in the volume of credit counseling and DMPs
in the late-1990s led many creditors to reevaluate the expenses
associated with supporting the counseling system. Many concluded
that their fair share payments to the credit counseling industry
constituted an excessive expense for creditors and an excessive

Winton E. Williams, Consumer Credit Counseling Services: A Growing Private-Sector
Response to Counterproductive Collection Practices That May Lead to Bankruptcy, 7 J.
BANKR. L. & PRAC. 47, 52 (1997) (noting the growth from 200 to 1200 by 1996). At the
same time, a new group of non-NFCC affiliated agencies flooded the market, eventually
outnumbering NFCC agencies by more than five to one. See CREDIT COUNSELING IN
CRISIS, supra note 30, at 7 (reporting more than 1,000 agencies in 2002, only 150 of which
were affiliated with the NFCC). After a string of recent mergers and closures, industry
experts now estimate a total of around 400 agencies, although the number of offices run
by these agencies is unknown. See Leslie E. Linfield, Credit Couseling Update: The
'Perfect Storm" Brewing, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Apr. 2005, at 30, 31. Many of these new
entrants are members of the other coordinating organization for credit counselors in the
United States, the Association of Independent Consumer Credit Counseling Agencies
(AICCCA), located online at http://www.aiccca.orgabout.cfm.
32.
Williams, supra note 31, at 51-52.
33.
Id. at 52-53, 59-62 (explaining in part why creditors demand 100%
payment in DMPs); NFCC, Personal Plans & Solutions, Debt Management Plan,
http://www.debtadvice.org/PersPlans/persplans-02.html
(explaining
that
DMPs
generally last three to five years, resulting in payoff of debt, and creditors offer not
remission, but waiver of fees); AICCCA, FAQS, at http://www.aiccca.org/pressroom.cfm (explaining that DMPs involve concessions by creditors to reduce or eliminate
interest and penalties-not remission of principal-and require up to sixty months of
payments); CREDIT COUNSELING IN CRISIS, supra note 31, at 21-24 (explaining that
secured debts are excluded and that creditors will grant only three kinds of
concessions: re-aging accounts, interest reductions, and fee and penalty waivers).
34.
ABUSIVE PRACTICES, supra note 31, at 2, 34-35; CREDIT COUNSELING IN
CRISIS, supra note 31, at 6-7.
35.
CREDIT COUNSELING IN CRISIS, supra note 31, at 7-8, 13, 23-24; Linfield,

supra note 31, at 30.
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benefit for counseling agencies. 36 Thus, many creditors sharply
scaled back or even eliminated their fair share payments, pushing the
credit counseling industry to the edge. 37 To counter this faltering
financial support, some counseling agencies adopted pricing schemes
and servicing tactics that placed heavy financial demands on
consumer debtors and generated large profits for affiliated
companies. 38 Following a Congressional investigation of the industry,
several of the key bad actors have either left the market 39 or
amended their business models to adopt more suitable pricing
structures and to reduce or eliminate conflicts of interest with forprofit affiliates. 40 An inherent and fundamental conflict remains,
however, between the counseling agencies' dependency on DMP-based
fair share payments from creditors and the counselors' ostensible
mission to provide effective assistance to consumer debtors.
No reliable public data exist on the number of consumers who
have avoided bankruptcy through private credit counseling and
DMPs, but recent reports indicate that counseling requests have
risen sharply, while the rate of creditor acceptance of DMPs remains
low. 41 While counseling agencies assisted about 250,000 clients in
1988, that number had risen to nearly a million by 1996.42 By 2003,
counseling industry representatives were reporting at least
2.5 million counseling requests per year. 43 In the 1990s, industry
officials suggested that approximately 34% of consumer credit
counseling clients were able to resolve their debt problems with a
DMP, while another 34% could manage with simple budgetary

36.
See David A. Lander, Recent Developments in Consumer Debt Counseling
Agencies, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Feb. 2002, at 14, 15; ABUSIVE PRACTICES, supra note 31,
at 35 (noting that fair share payments were taking up 25-30% of some creditors'
collections budgets by the late 1990s).
37.
See CREDIT COUNSELING IN CRISIS, supra note 31, at 10-13, 20; Lander,
supra note 36, at 14; ABUSIVE PRACTICES, supra note 31, at 35.
38.
For a detailed discussion of some of these tactics and the harm they caused
consumer debtors, see ABUSIVE PRACTICES, supra note 31, at 1-5, 10-31, 35-36;
CREDIT COUNSELING IN CRISIS, supra note 31, at 13-17, 31-34.

39.
Ironically, the most famous "bad actor," the heavily advertised AmeriDebt,
filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection in June 2004. See In re AmeriDebt Inc.,
Case No. 04-23649-PM (Bankr. D. Md. 2004). In September 2004, a trustee was
appointed, who immediately began the liquidation of AmeriDebt's assets in
anticipation of an eventual dissolution of the company. See ABUSIVE PRACTICES, supra
note 31, at 47.
40.
See ABUSIVE PRACTICES, supra note 31, at 45, 47-53. Many agencies
remain financially strapped, forced to seek additional support from sources in the nonprofit sector, such as the United Way. See CREDIT COUNSELING IN CRISIS, supra note
31, at 20.
41.
See infra text accompanying notes 43, 45.
42.
See Williams, supra note 31, at 53.
43.
See Leslie E. Linfield, Consumer Credit CounselingReform: The Good, the
Bad and the Ugly, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Nov. 2004, at 14 (noting that many more than
this-perhaps as many as 9 million-might have sought help with non-affiliated
agencies).
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instruction. 44
Beginning in the late-1990s, though, creditors
increasingly imposed restrictive criteria on accepting consumers into
DMPs, sometimes not even making these criteria clear to the
counselors. 45 By 2001, creditor rejections of proposed DMPs had
become "common though often illogical," and creditors were offering
fewer interest-rate reductions and other concessions to facilitate such
46
plans.
B. Credit Counseling in the Netherlands: Municipal Banks and the
NVVK Voluntary Debt Adjustment Model
As in the United States, the volume of consumer credit in the
Netherlands grew exponentially from the 1960s to the 1980s, as did
incidences of excessive debt. 47 Rather than amend the Bankruptcy
Act to accommodate consumer interests, the Dutch response focused
on credit counseling. The Dutch counseling system would face its
own crisis by the late-1990s, however, pushing the Netherlands
toward fundamental reform.
1. A Different Approach to Organizing Credit Counseling
The credit counseling system in the Netherlands was also
initiated and supported by banks, but the banks involved were
originally very different. Beginning in the 1930s, Dutch credit
regulations restricted commercial lending to consumers, but they
encouraged municipalities to create their own banks-funded and
controlled by local city councils-to make available low-interest loans
to their consumer citizens on a tax-free, break-even basis.48 These
municipal credit banks, or gemeentelijke kredietbanken (GKBs), were
pushed out of the consumer lending market in the late 1950s as
finance companies and commercial banks regained dominance. The
meteoric rise of consumer indebtedness, however, created a new
mission for the GKBs: credit counseling.4 9
The coordinating
organization for these GKBs, the Dutch Association for Consumer
Credit, or Nederlandse Vereniging voor Volkskrediet (NVVK), has

44.

Williams, supra note 31, at 52-53.

CREDIT COUNSELING IN CRISIS, supra note 31, at 12-13.
46.
See Pushed off the financial cliff, CONSUMER REPORTS, July 2001, available at
http://www.consumerreports.org/main/detail.jsp?CONTENT<>cnt_id=85425&FOLDER<
>folder-id=18151.
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See, e.g., Nick Huls, Alternatives to Personal Bankruptcy, in
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been instrumental in facilitating and organizing credit counseling in
the Netherlands for decades. In contrast to the U.S. counseling
model, Dutch creditors generally pay nothing to the GKBs. Credit
counseling in the Netherlands is funded primarily by local city
councils and sometimes by small contributions from debtors, but
never more than 6% of the total installments paid through to
creditors under a plan.50
In 1979, the NVVK, in consultation with representatives of the
commercial banks, developed its Code of Conduct for Debt
Arrangement (Gedragscode Schuldregeling), which has become the
51
gold standard for consumer credit restructuring in the Netherlands.
Pursuant to the Code, the consumer debtor submits an application for
debt arrangement to the local GKB, along with complete financial
information, and the GKB decides whether or not a debt adjustment
and repayment plan are feasible. 52 Despite the unitary NVVK code of
conduct, practices among the various GKBs differ substantially.
From the late-1980s to the mid-1990s, however, GKBs rejected about
half of these applications, mainly because of the debtor's "insufficient
53
repayment capacity" to manage a payment plan.
For accepted applications, the GKB administers a standard
54
payment plan, provided that all creditors agree to accept the plan.
In the 1980s, creditors accepted the terms of such GKB-proposed

50.
See id. at 300.
51.
See Gedragscode,
http:/www.volkskrediet.nlgedragscode.html;
Huls,
Alternatives, supra note 47, at 294. The Code has been amended periodically and it
was amended substantially in 2000 to react to the implementation of the new Dutch
consumer bankruptcy law.
N. JUNGMAN, ET AL., VAN SCHULD NAAR SCHONE LEI:
EVALUATIE WET SCHULDSANERING NATUURLIJKE PERSONEN 47-49 (2001), available at

http://www.wodc.nl/onderzoeken/onderzoek-wOO190.asp?loc=/onderwerp#
[hereinafter
WODC REPORT].
52.
See Huls, Alternatives, supra note 47, at 295.
53.
See id. at 300; N.J. Huls, Etat des lieux en mati~re d'assainissement lgal
des dettes aux Pays-Bas, in

LES CONSOMMATEURS

ET L'EUROPE DES SERVICES

FINANCIERS 141, 146 (Pierre DeJemeppe ed., 1992) [hereinafter Huls, Etat des lieux].
54.
The standard plan might be administered in two ways:
In a debt
rehabilitation (schuldsanering),the GKB essentially makes a consolidation loan to the
debtor, passing on a lump-sum payment to creditors of their pro-rata share of the
debtor's entire projected disposable income, calculated as described below. The debtor
repays the GKB over the life of the plan, while in a debt intermediation
(schuldbemiddeling); the GKB collects monthly disposable income payments from the
debtor and passes these payments on to creditors. See WODC REPORT, supra note 51,
at 31. At least in the late 1990s, about three-fourths of Dutch plans were lump-sum
debt rehabilitation consolidations. See id. at 43, tbl. 5. In contrast, U.S. DMPs
overwhelmingly (if not exclusively) follow the debt intermediation model. See supra
Part II.B.1. In addition, some Dutch localities also have special funds from which the
local GKB can draw to offer grants for debt consolidation, which do not have to be
repaid, although many localities have reduced or eliminated these funds after passage
of the new Dutch consumer bankruptcy law in 1998. See WODC REPORT, supra note
51, at 33-35.
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plans in all but a very few cases. 55 The standard plan includes a
freeze on accruing interest and recovery fees; already in the 1980s,
about one-quarter of all plans offered a voluntary remission of
between 5% and 90% of the principal debt that could not be paid over
the life of these plans. 56 The standard amount that these plans
require the debtor to dedicate to the plan has changed recently, as
discussed below. 51 Before 2001, however, debtors were forced to turn
over to the GKB all income in excess of 94% of the legally prescribed
social assistance minimum income-essentially
the welfare
qualification level-for three years. 58 The percentage payment to
creditors is thus determined according to the debtor's abilities rather
than the creditors' claims.
Given these substantial demands,
however, by the early 1990s, Dutch credit counselors had observed a
recidivism rate of about 30% (this percentage refers to debtors who
were unable to fulfill their obligations under these plans and thus
returned for another attempt at a
different negotiated
arrangement) .59

2.

Rising Debt-to-Income Ratios and the Voluntary Process In
Decline

The early-1990s witnessed rising numbers of requests for debt
counseling and a declining percentage of cases where counselors were
able to broker out-of-court arrangements. Only the GKBs publish
their data on the rate of agreement to voluntary plans, and estimates
suggest that just over half of all counseling is administered by other
counseling agencies and organizations. 60 Nonetheless, the public
GKB data reveal clear trends that can be extrapolated to the entire
debt counseling industry in the Netherlands. 61 The number of debt

55.
Huls, Alternatives, supra note 47, at 296 (suggesting an overall creditor
rejection rate of 2-3%).
56.
See Huls, Etat des lieux, supra note 48, at 146.
57.
For a discussion of current practice, see infra Part III.A.2.
58 Huls, Alternatives, supra note 47, at 296-98.
59.
See Kamerstukken II 1995/96, 22 969, nr.32, p. 3; RESEARCH VOOR BELEID,
SCHULD EN BOETE:

WETSVOORSTEL SCHULDSANERING BLIJFT MENINGEN VERDELEN

(1996), available at http://www.researchvoorbeleid.nllbasis/artikelen-herfst-1996/
schuld.htm.
60.
See WODC REPORT, supra note 51, at 36. A survey of WSNP debtors in
1999 and 2000 revealed that 51% of them had received pre-WSNP counseling from a
GKB, as opposed to social service agencies or private counselors. See id. at 81.
61.
See Huls, Alternatives, supra note 47, at 306, n.6. One survey of GKB and
non-GKB debt counseling files in 1997 discovered a similar general rate of plan
establishment for the mixed group as for just GKB-brokered arrangements. See
WODC REPORT, supra note 51, at 43 (reporting 39% success for GKB and non-GKB

counselors in 1997, the same rate as reported by the NVVK just for GKB plans). On
the other hand, when it analyzed the results of individual agencies, this same survey
reported that the four GKBs surveyed had quite low success rates, while non-GKB
counselors, especially the three social welfare agencies surveyed, achieved plans
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counseling petitions filed annually with GKBs rose from about 13,000
in the early-1980s, 62 to 19,000 by 1992, then jumped to just over
31,500 in 1998.63 The number of payment plan agreements brokered
by the GKBs, however, remained steady at about 10,000 to 11,000 per
year. 64 The rate of "success" '65 in forging agreements in the voluntary
plan process thus fell sharply from just over 50% in 1992 to about
35% in 1994, where it largely remained through 1998.66
Experts attribute this decline to two factors: larger debts and
more creditors. 67 Debtors' incomes had risen much more slowly than
consumer debt levels, significantly reducing the percentage
repayment that debtors could offer creditors. One prominent survey
of files in the voluntary arrangement process in 1997, for example,
found that 71% of debtors filing petitions for debt counseling had
total income of less than about $12,000 per year. 68 After deducting
the exempt 94% social assistance minimum income, only 33% of all
surveyed debtors were able to pay more than $100 per month to
69
creditors, and only 23% were able to pay more than $150 per month.
Thus, over the standard three-year plan, fewer than a one-fourth of
debtors could offer $5000 or more to their creditors-less than half of
their average debt burden of about $11,000.70

markedly more often-in as many as 65% of cases. See id. at 43, tbl. 6. Thus,
extrapolating averages for GKBs to all credit counseling may skew the results
downward somewhat, but this likely nonetheless provides a roughly accurate
evaluation of the voluntary process.
62.
See Huls, Alternatives, supra note 47, at 301, tbl. 1 (showing 12,995
applications in 1981, 14,379 in 1982, 14, 358 in 1983, and 13, 350 in 1984)
63.
See WODC REPORT, supra note 46, at 189, Annex 5.
64.
Id.
65.
Note that "success" here may well be a transitory condition. Recall that
30% of debtors were unable to fulfill their obligations under these plans in the 1980s,
See supra, text accompanying note 59. This Author found no publicly available dataand suspects none exists--on the rate of successful completion of these post-1990s
plans.
66.
See WODC REPORT, supra note 51, at 189, Annex 5. The agreement rates
of individual GKBs varied immensely, however. One study identified rates ranging
from 26% to 65% among various local GKBs. See id. at 43, tbl. 6.
67.
See id. at 37.
68.
See id. at 27, 39 (reporting 71% of debtors with income below 2000 Dutch
gilders per month). The average exchange rate for gilders to U.S. dollars in 1997 (and
in later years) was about 2:1.
FXHistory: historical currency exchange rates,
http://www.oanda.comlconvert/fxhistory (last visited Nov. 17, 2005) [hereinafter
FXHistory].
69.
WODC REPORT, supra note 51, at 44, fig. 5.
70.
See id. at 41 (reporting an average debt of 21,927 gilders). The spread of
debt loads around this average is slightly weighted to lower levels, so the median or
"middle" debt level would likely have been somewhere around 10,000 gilders, or $5,000.
FXHistory, supra note 68, at fig. 4. A 1992 study of the voluntary arrangement process
had identified an average debt burden of about $8,000, suggesting a significant rise in
debt during the 1990s. WODC REPORT, supra note 51, at 41.
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After analyzing a number of characteristics of these debtors,
such as age, marital status, number of children, income, and total
debt load, the 1997 study concluded that one factor clearly
distinguished debtors who succeeded from those who failed to
establish a voluntary arrangement with creditors: the percentage of
71
total debt that could be paid off in the standard three-year plan.
The net amount of income available for creditors was not significant
in isolation. Rather, the key indicator was the volume of debt against
which that income would have to be applied. Accepted plans offered
on average a 56% repayment of debt, while rejected plans offered on
average only 27%.72 Creditors are obviously focused on their bottom
line, but this study suggests that absolute numbers are not as
important as relative amounts. Creditors were increasingly unwilling
to entertain repayment plans as the percentage of their recovery fell
below 40-45%, even if the amount of payment offered seemed
substantial in absolute terms.

III.

CONVERGENCE: DUTCH EXPANSION AND U.S. RESTRICTION OF
CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY

In the late-1990s, policymakers became concerned first about the
falling number of Dutch voluntary debt arrangements and then about
the rising number of U.S. consumer bankruptcy filings. As a result,
the Dutch government and parliament began an eight-year-long
process of implementing a more forgiving approach to consumer debt
relief, while the U.S. Congress began an eight-year-long debate about
restricting access to debt relief. The Netherlands joined France and
Germany in moving decisively toward the U.S. model 73 by introducing
a statutory discharge of unpaid consumer debt and a fresh start for
debtors. The United States, in contrast, moved toward a more
restrictive, European approach to consumer debt relief. This Part
focuses on the process that brought Dutch and U.S. law into
surprising parallel and addresses the key elements of the laws
resulting from that process. A survey of recent experience under the
new Dutch model offers compelling insights as to what is in store
under the radically revised U.S. law.

71.

Id. at 46.

72.
73.

See id.
See, e.g.,

Nick

Huls, American Influences on European Consumer

Bankruptcy Law, 15 J. CONSUMER POL'Y 125 (1992).
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A. The Netherlands Amends Its Bankruptcy Law To Add Consumer
Relief
The road to consumer debt relief began in the Netherlands just
as had in Germany; the Dutch produced a system very similar to the
German model. 74
Like German policymakers, 75 their Dutch
counterparts convened a commission to examine the Dutch business
bankruptcy law; however, the commission released a report in 1989
that also suggested offering expanded relief to consumers. 7 6 While
the German commission strongly resisted the notion of freeing
consumers from overburdening debts, the Dutch Mijnssen
77
commission readily accepted this new form of relief from the outset.
In multiple places in the legislative record of the new Dutch law,
lawmakers noted that around 200,000 Dutch consumers had fallen
into trouble with overburdening debts. 78
After the general
deregulation of consumer credit in the early 1980s, the Netherlands
had experienced a significant increase in the number of consumer
bankruptcy cases 79 (in the classic, creditor-collection sense80 ). This
rising indicator of consumer economic distress became a cause for
concern for policymakers, who sought a direct legislative solution to
the problem.
The fundamentals of the new Dutch system of statutory
consumer debt relief have changed very little since the introduction of
the government reform bill in the lower house of parliament in
December 1992.81 Indeed, the legislative record reveals relatively few
points of dispute over the new law. It nonetheless took many years
for the bill to wind its way through the legislative process and emerge
as a new law in June 1998,82 effective December 1, 1998.83 With the

74.
Dutch lawmakers seem to have paid little attention to contemporaneous
developments in neighboring Germany, however. See infra note 156.
75.
See Kilborn, German Law, supra note 7, at 269 (describing the formation of
the German bankruptcy review commission in 1978 and the release of its second report
in 1986).
76.
See Huls, Etat des lieux, supra note 53, at 150; Kamerstukken II 1992/93,
22 969, nr.3, pp. 3-4.
77.
See Huls, Etat des lieux, supra note 53, at 150-51, 154. It may well be that
the Dutch commission expressed less hostility to the Anglo-American notion of
discharge, thanks in large part to the influence of a report by the pre-eminent Dutch
scholar Nick Huls, who had examined the U.S. consumer bankruptcy system in depth
and positively appraised its potential for the Netherlands. See id. at 148, n.7.
78.
See, e.g., Kamerstukken II 1992/93, 22 969, nr.3, p. 27; Kamerstukken II
1994/95, 22 969, nr.19, pp. 1, 3; Handelingen II 1994/95, nr. 99, p. 6073; Handelingen II
1994/95, nr. 100, p 6109.
79.
See, e.g., Handelingen II 1994/95, nr. 99, p. 6072.
80.
See supra Part II.
81.
See Kamerstukken I 1992/93, 22 696, nr.3 (MvT).
82.
See Law of 25 June 1998, Stb. 1998, 445 (Neth.).
83.
See Order of 9 Nov. 1998, Stb. 1998, 622 (Neth.); Handelingen I 1997/98, nr.
34, p. 1757. The first WSNP case was opened around 9:45 AM (ET) on December 1,
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final Law on Debt Rehabilitation of Natural Persons (Wet
schuldsanering natuurlijke personen), generally known as the
WSNP,8 4 the Dutch legislature added a new third and final title to
the Dutch Bankruptcy Act of 1896.
Both German and Dutch reformers ultimately defended the
radical new fresh start8 5 policy primarily in terms of offering debtors
a perspective for their respective futures; the policy gave debtors an
incentive to remain productive workers rather than cowering in the
shadow of insurmountable debt for the remainder of their productive
lives.8 6
Despite fears of undermining debtor responsibility and
payment morality,8 7 lawmakers insisted that reinvigorating
consumer debtors would avoid a series of equally undesirable social
ills, including poverty, social isolation, and lost productivity. 8 In
addition, Dutch policymakers hoped that the threat of a potentially
less attractive, court-imposed payment plan would act as a "stick
behind the door" to goad creditors into compromising with debtors
89
and entering into more voluntary debt arrangements.

1998, in Haarlem, when the court converted the first of many old-style bankruptcy
(collection) cases to a new WSNP (relief) case. See Primeur in Haarlem, WSNP
UPDATE, no. 8 (Feb. 1999), available at http://www.wsnp.rvr.org/bibliotheek/data/
update/Update8. htm.
84.
The acronym is generally rendered 'Vsnp," according to European
capitalization standards, but for ease of reading by U.S. readers, the Author uses all
capitals. The agency currently charged with administering and monitoring the new
law has a wonderful website dedicated to all matters relating to the WSNP. See Wsnp
Home Page, at http://www.wsnp.rvr.org.
85.
Dutch uses at least two phrases to capture this distinctly U.S. concept:
schone lei or "clean slate" is the most common, but nieuwe start or "new start" is also
encountered.
86.
Compare Kilborn, German Law, supra note 7, at 270-71, with Huls, Etat
des lieux, supra note 53, at 150; Kamerstukken II 1992/93, 22 969, nr.3, pp. 2, 6;
Kamerstukken II 1994/95, 22 969, nr.19, pp. 3, 20; Handelingen II 1994/95, nr. 99, pp.
6071, 6075, 6078.
87.
See, e.g., Kamerstukken II 1992/93, 22 969, nr. 3, pp. 4-5. The Justice
Minister argued forcefully that the asset liquidation and stringent payment plan
requirements of the new law would avoid any undermining of responsibility or
payment morality. See id. at 5.
88.
See Handelingen II 1994/95, nr. 99, pp. 6081; Kamerstukken I 1995/96, 22
969, nr.34b, p. 2; Handelingen II 1997/98, nr. 61, p. 4580.
89.
This image-the "stick behind the door" (stok achter de deur) menacing
creditors with unpleasant consequences if they refused to agree to out-of-court
workouts-is repeated over and over in the legislative history and commentary as
representing one of the primary purposes of the new Dutch law.
See, e.g.,
Kamerstukken II 1992/93, 22 969, nr.3, pp. 6-7; Kamerstukken II 1994/95, 22 969,
nr.19, p. 17; Handelingen II 1994/95, nr. 99, p. 6079; Kamerstukken I 1995/96, 22 969,
nr.34b, p. 2; Kamerstukken II 1997/98, 25 672, nr.5, p. 2; Handelingen II 1997/98, nr.
61, p. 4576; Handelingen II 1997/98, nr. 61, pp. 4580-81; Kamerstukken I 1997/98, 22
969, nr.297b, p. 7.
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1. The Voluntary Plan Process: Trouble at the Gates to the WSNP
Notwithstanding the precipitous decline of the voluntary plan
process, the WSNP makes out-of-court payment plan negotiations the
mandatory entryway into the new consumer debt relief process. Like
the German law, 90 the WSNP requires debtors to include with their
petitions a declaration explaining why "there is no real possibility to
come to an out-of-court debt rehabilitation arrangement." 91 This
declaration must be issued by local authorities in the debtor's
municipality or, more often, by the local GKB or other credit
counseling agency to whom local authorities have delegated this
duty.9 2 As described above, 93 the local GKB or other counseling
agency most likely will have evaluated the debtor's payment potential
and rejected (or unsuccessfully attempted) an out-of-court workout
with creditors. The new law thus attempts to both encourage and
leverage off of the decades-old system of credit counseling and
voluntary arrangements administered largely by local authorities.
As in Germany, 94 the process of structuring and negotiating a
voluntary payment plan with creditors in the Netherlands often
impedes Dutch consumer debtors' ability to obtain needed relief.
Delays vary considerably depending on local conditions and the
complexity of debtors' problems, but debtors often face two types of
delays: consumer waiting periods and creditor holdout delays. First,
estimates suggest that in two-thirds of Dutch municipalities,
consumers face waiting periods of two to six months just to get
appointments with local debt counselors. 95
Second, creditors
understandably do not view responding to debt arrangement
proposals as an issue of urgent necessity, and a last few holdout
creditors often need more time-consuming prodding from debt
counselors. Combined delays of three to nine months often result
from the initial waiting period and the process of collecting-and
sometimes cajoling-creditors' assent to voluntary plans. 96 Waiting
periods have increased substantially due to the greater demand on
97
counselors following the enactment of the WSNP.
Unfortunately, the result of this negotiation process is seldom
worth the wait. The rate of success for this time- and labor-intensive
process has continued to decline after the WSNP entered force in

90.
91.
WSNP are
the WSNP
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

See Kilborn, German Law, supra note 7, at 272-73.
Faillissementswet [F) [Bankruptcy Law] art. 285 (Neth.). Citations to the
made by reference to the Bankruptcy Act (Faillissementswetor F) of which
is the third and concluding title.
See Id. at art. 285(1)(e); WODC REPORT, supra note 51, at 12, n.2.
See supra Part II.B.
See Kilborn, German Law, supra note 7, at 274.
See WODC REPORT, supra note 51, at 32.
See id. at 32-33, 53.
See id. at 53.
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December 1998. After falling from just over 50% in 1992 to about
35% in the years from 1994 to 1998,98 the rate of successfully
brokered out-of-court plans fell again suddenly to 28% in 199999 and
to 26% by 2001.100
From 2003 through 2004, requests for debt
adjustments filed with GKBs rose from 34,500 to 39,000, but the
number of plans accepted by creditors fell from 5,300 to 3,500; this
initial success rate continued to plunge from 15% to 9%.101 Credit
counselors have reported that creditors are generally less willing to
enter into voluntary arrangements now that the WSNP offers a clear
and predictable alternative. 0 2 The desired "stick behind the door"
operation of the new law to encourage more out-of-court
10 3
arrangements does not seem to be working.

98.
See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
99.
See WODC REPORT, supra note 51, at 37. The average success rate for
brokering out-of-court plans remained stable from 1999 to 2002 at about 30%. See
RAAD VOOR RECHTSBIJSTAND DEN BOSCH, SAMENVAPTING RESULTATEN ENQUETE
WISSELWERKING MINNELIJKE REGELING-WSNP (2002), available at http://www.wsnp.

rvr.org.
100.

See

ROEL

SCHOLLEN,

ADVIESRAPPORT

"SCHULDREGELEN

DAT

DOE JE

SAMEN," Summary, § 3.1 (2003), available at http://www.wsnp.rvr.org/bibliotheek/data/
ondstu/adv schuld samen.htm.
101.

See NEDERLANDSE VERENIGING VOOR VOLKSKREDIET, JAARVERSLAG 2004,

at 22-23 (2005), availableat http://www.volkskrediet.nl/NVVK_Jaarverslag-2004.pdf.
102.
See WODC REPORT, supra note 51, at 56.
103.
For an enlightening and insightful discussion of why adoption of a more
closely monitored and predictable alternative in the WSNP has shifted creditors'
incentives toward refusing out-of-court arrangements, see Nick Huls, et al., Can
Voluntary Debt Settlement and Consumer Bankruptcy Coexist? The Development of
Dutch Insolvency Law, in CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 269, 273,

274-75, tbl. 1 (Johanna Niemi-Kiesildinen, et al. eds., 2003); See also WODC REPORT,
supra note 51, at 61-64, 98. Another aspect of the system designed to encourage
voluntary arrangements-the so-called "accord"-also seems to be enjoying little
success. After an in-court WSNP process has been opened, the debtor may, but need
not, present a proposed voluntary payment plan to creditors for their vote. See F arts.
329, 331. The debtor's plan can be approved by the judge and imposed on recalcitrant
creditors ("crammed down," to use the U.S. buzz phrase) so long as a majority in
number and amount of claims of unsecured and preferred creditors appearing at the
hearing vote in favor of the plan. See F art. 332(3). Alternatively, the court can cram
down the plan on one or more creditors with particularly large claims if: (a) threequarters in number of preferred and unsecured creditors vote in favor of the plan, and
(b) the refusal of the larger claimant(s) to approve the plan was "unreasonable" given
the circumstances, particularly the percentage that the rejecting creditor(s) stand(s) to
recover if the WSNP process continues without a voluntary plan. See F art. 333(4).
This cram down process was invoked successfully in only 1% of cases in the first two
years of the new law. See WODC REPORT, supra note 51, at 72, tbl. 9, 146-47. By 2003
and 2004, still only about 2% of cases concluded with an accord. See Centraal Bureau
voor de Statistiek, Meer Schuldsaneringen in 2004 (Mar. 29, 2005), available at
http://www.cbs.nl/nllpublicaties/artikelen/algemeen/webmagazine/artikelen/2005/167 1k
.htm [hereinafter CBS Stats 2004]; Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek, Ruim 10
duizend schuldsaneringen in 2003 (Mar. 29, 2004), available at http://www.cbs.nll
nllpublicaties/artikelenalgemeen/webmagazine/artikelen2004/1430k.htm [hereinafter,
CBS Stats 2003]. Experience under the very similar cram down provision of the
German consumer bankruptcy system produced similar results, and this provision is
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This low rate of agreed out-of-court arrangements is not
surprising, given that the reasons for failure of voluntary
arrangements-high debt levels and low percentage payoff
capacity104-have continued to exist since the early 1990s. A study of
WSNP cases in 1999 and 2000 suggested that the in-court process
was serving the very debtors that one would expect to be poor
candidates for an out-of-court workout. The surveyed cases revealed
an average annual debtor income of about $12,500 and an average
debt load of about $50,000.105 These debtors had average fixed
expenses of about $400 per month,1 0 6 not to mention floating
expenses for food and other household expenses. Even if debtors
expended only a modest $400 per month for food and other variable
household expenses, an average of at most $3,000 per year, or about
$9,000 over a three-year voluntary plan, would reasonably be
available for creditors 10 7 These amounts are well under the 40% payoff break-point at which earlier studies had suggested creditors refuse
to accept a voluntary plan. l0 8 In the declarations issued by local
counseling authorities in support of these debtors' petitions, nearly
70% explained that the voluntary process had failed because "not all
creditors [were] in agreement" or there was "no cooperation from
creditors." Over 20% more attributed the failure to the debtors'

slated for elimination there. See Kilborn, German Law, supra note 7, at 275-77. In
both Germany and the Netherlands, policymakers now propose to move this cram down
phase into the pre-court voluntary process, allowing the debtor to ask the court in
summary proceedings to impose an out-of-court plan on one or more "unreasonably"
disagreeable creditors. See, e.g., Kamerstukken II 2004/05, 29 942, nr.3, pp. 5, 16-19;
Kilborn, German Law, supra note 7, at 277. Although Huls suggested in the 1980s
that only 2-3% of voluntary arrangements fell through due to lack of cooperation by
one creditor, See Huls, Alternatives, supra note 47, at 296, one prominent study of cases
from 1999 and 2000 suggested that 21% of voluntary workouts failed due to one
creditor's refusal, and more than half failed due to refusal by three or fewer creditors.
See WODC REPORT, supra note 51, at 83, tbl. 17.
104.
See supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text.
105.
See WODC Report, supra note 51, at 76-78. Even excluding the former
businesspeople with somewhat higher income and debt levels, the average nonentrepreneur debtor income was just under $12,000 per year, chasing an average debt
load of about $30,000-still far too lopsided of a ratio to cover living expenses and still
offer creditors at least a 40%-50% recovery over three years. Later data suggest
income gaining ground on debts, but not enough to shift the tide on out-of-court
settlements. See 2002: meer zaken, meer beeindigingen, WSNP UPDATE, no. 29 (Mar.
2003), available at http://www.wsnp.rvr.orgbibliotheekldata/updateUpdate29.htm
(reporting average income of C1,070 per month (about $16,000 per year) and an
average debt load of €24,000 (about $30,000) for "non-entrepreneur" debtors filing in
2002).
106.
See WODC Report, supra note 51, at 76-78.
107.
The debtors themselves overwhelmingly (71%) reported on their petitions
that they had no repayment capacity, while the average repayment capacity for those
who reported some ability to pay was only about $125 per month-or $4,500 over a
three-year plan. See id. at 82.
108.
See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
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"insufficient repayment capacity" or "lack of stable income." 10 9 The
voluntary process apparently remains by-and-large a simple numbers
game.
2. The In-Court Process and Payment Plans-How Much?
If the debtor's documents are in order, if the debtor is in good
faith, and if the debtor is unable to continue making normal
payments on debts, 110 the court will take several actions. The court
appoints a trustee to collect and liquidate the debtor's available
assets and administer a payment plan drawing on three to five years
of the debtor's future income. 111 The court also appoints a "judgecommissioner" to supervise the trustee and handle disputes later in
the case. 112 Like its German counterpart,11 3 the Dutch in-court
process includes two stages to extract value from the debtor: the sale
of the debtor's non-exempt assets 114 and the collection of the debtor's
115
non-exempt income.
A creditor's main source of value, if any, is the debtor's future
disposable income. Most bankrupt consumers in the Netherlands and
elsewhere have no property either legally available' 16 or practically

109.
WODC REPORT, supra note 51, at 82, tbl. 16.
110.
F arts. 284, 288. These good faith and insolvency requirements are similar
to those imposed by the French law, and the Dutch rejection rate is quite similar to the
rejection rate in France-about 9% in the early years of the new systems. See e.g.,
WODC REPORT, supra note 51, at 72, 88-91; cf. Kilborn, French Law, supra note 7, at
636, n.115 (reporting a rejection rate for French petitions falling from 10% to 7% from
1990 to 2003).
111.
F arts. 287(3), 316. In the early years, lawyers were appointed as trustee in
about 50% of cases, and the GKB or other counselor who helped the debtor initially was
appointed in another quarter. See WODC REPORT, supra note 51, at 83-84, tbl. 18.
One curious aspect of estate administration unique to Dutch law is the so-called
"postblokkade," which requires the debtor's mail to be diverted to the trustee during
the course of the case. F art. 287(9). This provision was designed to ensure that the
trustee would receive complete information about payments being made to and
undeclared obligations incurred by the debtor, both of which would affect the
administration of the estate. Kamerstukken II 1997/98, 25 672, nr.3, pp. 5-6. The
trustee is required to hand deliver to the debtor any mail not pertaining to the debtor's
financial situation. F arts. 99(1), 327. Trustees report that having this access to the
debtor's mail is very helpful (at least for the first year or so) in uncovering hidden or
overlooked assets and liabilities. WODC REPORT, supra note 51, at 104-05.
112.
F arts. 287(3), 314.
113.
Kilborn, German Law, supra note 7, at 278-80.
114.
F arts. 295(4)-(6), 314-327, 347.
115.
F arts. 295(1)-(3), 343-46.
116.
The range of property exempted from seizure and liquidation is very
similar under the Dutch WSNP and European and moderately generous U.S. state
exemption laws. See F art. 295(4)-(5); Burgerlijk Wetboek [BW] [Civl Code] bk.3 art. 5
(Neth.); see also Wetboek van Burgerlijke Rechtsvondering [Rv] [Code of Civil
Procedure] art. 447 (Neth.) (exempting identified items in normal execution
proceedings).
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valuable enough to sell to produce a distribution to creditors. 117 Like
the earlier German and French consumer debt relief systems, 1 8 the
WSNP generally requires the court to impose a rehabilitation
payment plan on the debtor. 119 Consistent with the developing
European approach, the Dutch WSNP requires the debtor to hand
over to the trustee for a certain term of years all non-exempt income;
120
that is, income legally subject to seizure by creditors.
Unlike other European systems (and the U.S. system), the
WSNP measures "exempt" income not in terms of a percentage of the
debtor's total income, but in terms of a percentage of the official
welfare assistance level for various types of debtors-regardless of
each debtor's individual income. 121 By default, 122 the law requires
the debtor to turn over all income in excess of 90% of the social
assistance minimum, subject to a series of adjustments based on
certain of the debtor's household expenses. 123 The WSNP allows the
judge to increase the amount left to the debtor, however, at the
124
judge's apparently unfettered discretion.
How much income to reserve to debtors was a strenuously
debated topic in the legislative process. Legislators often questioned
the sufficiency of 90% of the social assistance minimum to support the
debtor-and possibly a family-for three years. 125 Because the social
assistance minimum takes into account children only in single-parent
households, legislators worried that debtors in two-parent families
(and all families with multiple children) would be particularly hard
pressed to manage on this meager income. 126 Legislators repeatedly
pressed for a 4% increase to at least match the amount left to debtors
under the NVVK out-of-court payment plan model. 12 7 After much
back-and-forth debate with the Justice Minister about the adequacy

117.
If debtors do have any valuable property, like houses, they will most likely
have granted security interests or mortgages in this property, and such secured
creditors' rights to take their collateral property from the debtor are unaffected by the
law. See F art. 299b; Huls, Etat des lieux, supra note 53, at 152.
118.
See e.g., Kilborn, German Law, supra note 7, at 267-68, 279 & n.131;
Kilborn, French Law, supra note 7, at 630-31.
119.
See F arts. 338(5), 343-46.
120.
F art. 295(2).
121.
See Rv art. 475d.
122.
The default rule is virtually never applied in practice. See infra note 126
and accompanying text.
123.
F art. 295(2); Rv art. 475d; Wet werk en bijstand [WWB] arts. 20-23
(Neth.).
124.
F art. 295(3).
125.
See, e.g., Kamerstukken II 1994/95, 22 969, nr.19, p. 3; Handelingen II
1994/95, nr. 99, pp. 6073, 6078,
126.
See, e.g., Kamerstukken II 1994/95, 22 969, nr.19, p. 4.
127.
See, e.g., Kamerstukken II 1994/95, 22 969, nr.24; Handelingen II 1994/95,
nr. 99,pp. 6073, 6078-80, 6083.
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of this 90% level, 128 the legislature capitulated and the 90%
exemption remained unchanged.
The courts would have the last word on the matter, however.
Ultimately, this issue was resolved "on the ground" through informal
coordination among courts, counseling agencies, and judicial
enforcement officials. In a surprising bit of private lawmaking, a
national working group of Dutch bankruptcy judges called Recofa
convened a commission in 2000 to harmonize in- and out-of-court
consumer debt rehabilitation practice by agreeing on a uniform basis
for calculating the so-called "amount to be left free" for debtors (vrij te
laten bedrag, or vtlb). 129 The Recofa calculation guide was released in
July 2001130 and has since been adopted as the standard by nearly all
courts, NVVK member credit counselors, and, increasingly, officials
in normal judicial execution proceedings. 131 The Recofa group thus
managed without legislative intervention to amend a crucial part of
the Dutch law and to standardize practice under the WSNP and the
NVVK out-of-court workout model.
Evidently, even before the Recofa guide was developed, very few
debtors were relegated to 90% of the social assistance minimum
income-the mandated level that is still, to this day, mandated by
law. 132 The Recofa guide, however, rejected the 90% level once and
for all. Consistent with judicial practice during the first two years of
the new law, the Recofa guide reserves 95% of the social assistance
minimum for debtors wholly dependent on public aid, and 100% for

128.
The Second Chamber early on requested that the Justice Minister review
the general exemption level in the execution law to see if it ought to be increased. See
Handelingen II 1994/95, nr. 99, p. 6083; Handelingen II 1994/95, nr. 100, p. 6128;
Kamerstukken II 1994/95, 22 969, nr.27; Kamerstukken II 1995/96, 22 969, nr.30.
Based on an evaluation that did not respond to the legislature's concerns, the minister
refused to consider an increase in the general exemption level. See Kamerstukken II
1995/96, 22 969, nr.31. The legislature ultimately dropped the issue after the minister
responded to a series of questions challenging the evaluation and the minister's
refusal, See Kamerstukken II 1995/96, 22 969, nr.32, although the First Chamber once
again brought up this issue before final passage of the legislation, and the minister
hinted at the practical solution to be implemented by judges and the NVVK, See
Handelingen I 1997/98, nr. 34, pp. 1742, 1752, 1755-57. Note that German legislators
undertook a similar process, and they ultimately increased the German exemption
levels substantially. See Kilborn, German Law, supra note 7, at 285-86.
129.
See Rekenmodel Recofa, WSNP UPDATE, no. 23 (Sept. 2001), available at
http://www.wsnp.rvr.org/bibliotheek/data/update/Update23.htm.
130.
Id.
WET

131.
See BEREKENING VAN HET VRIJ TE LATEN BEDRAG BIJ TOEPASSING VAN DE
SCHULDSANERING NATUURLIJKE PERSONEN, RAPPORT VAN DE WEKRGROEP

REKENMETHODE VTLB RECOFA § 1.1 (2005), available at http://www.wsnp.rvr.org/
bewindinfo/data/beleidsstukkenlrecofa/rapport%20januari%202005%20_ontkoppeld-.p
df [hereinafter REKENMODEL].
132.
See WODC REPORT, supra note 51, at 84-85, tbl.19, 96, 106-07. Early on,
courts calculated the exempt amount in a wide variety of ways, usually leaving more
than 90% of income to debtors, especially working debtors. See NICK HULS & VIVIAN
SCHELLEKENS, JE ZIET DE GATEN IN HUN HANDEN 58-59 (2001).
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133
debtors with income from at least eighteen hours of work per week.
Recofa adopted these higher percentages to respond to the debtor's
need to have some reserve for large or unexpected expenditure and to
encourage debtors to find and hold work. 3 4 Moreover, for working
singles (with and without children), to the extent that they earn more
than the standard minimum income level, the base minimum is
13
increased by approximately 40%. 5
Thus, using 2005 figures, 136 the Recofa model reserves to
working singles without children as much as €804.89 per month
(about $12,000 per year); working single parents can retain as much
as C1,034.85 per month (about $15,500 per year). 13 7 These two
groups represent about two-thirds of debtors in both the out-of-court
and WSNP debt adjustment processes. 1 38 Joint debtors with or
without children can retain as much as €1,207.32 per month (about
$18,000 per year) if both individuals work at least eighteen hours per
week; they retain €1,149.83 per month (about $17,250 per year) if
only one individual works. 139 Two-parent households with children
are the third largest group of distressed debtors, constituting about
20% in the in- and out-of-court processes. 140 This baseline of the
Dutch law thus leaves less income to debtors, on average, than
German and French law. In comparison, single debtors in Germany
in the early twenty-first century enjoyed a 100% exemption on the
first £939 per month (about $14,000 per year), although they could

133.
See REKENMODEL, supra note 131, §§ 5.1-52. Indeed, in a joint case in
which both partners work at least eighteen hours per week, the guide allocates 105% of
the social assistance minimum to the joint debtors together. See id. § 5.2.
134.
See id.
135.
See REKENMODEL, supra note 131, § 4.2; Rv art. 475d(1)(b); WWB art. 25.
136.
The base amounts of minimum assistance have risen only slightly for
inflation over time. Compare, for example, the amounts listed in the current Law on
Work and Assistance (WWB) with the amounts listed in its predecessor, the General
Assistance Law (Algemene Bijstandswet, or ABW) from 1995, available at
http://wetten.overheid.nl (by entering these law names and dates in a search).
137.
See REKENMODEL, supra note 131, § 4.2; WWB art. 25. Here and throughout
this paper, the Author has used an exchange rate of $1.25/C, which represents a rough
average of the EUR/USD exchange rate over the past 12 months, reduced for the fact
that the Euro has fallen sharply against the dollar in recent weeks. Oanda: The
Currency Site, http://www.oanda.comlconvert/fxhistory (last visited Nov. 2, 2005). The
2005 base monthly assistance amounts for single childless adults is £574.92 (about
$8,600 per year), and C804.88 (about $12,000 per year) for single parents. See WWB
art. 21. These base amounts are increased by up to C229.97 (about $3,450 per year) for
wage earners. See WWB art. 25. Technically, this increase applies only to singles with
higher than average expenses that hit their incomes harder because they cannot be
shared with another earner, but the Recofa model evidently assumes this situation
exists for all singles.
138.
WODC REPORT, supra note 51, at 74, tbl. 10 (reporting childless singles as
45% of all debtors, and single parents as about 21%, in both the voluntary and judicial
processes).
139.
REKENMODEL, supra note 131, § 4.1.
140.
WODC REPORT, supra note 51, at 74, tbl. 10.
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keep up to a maximum of €1,507 (about $22,500 per year) if they
earned more. 141 The French exemption scheme is more complicated,
but childless single debtors in 2005 can retain a maximum of E13,698
per year (about $17,000).142
Fortunately for Dutch debtors, the social assistance minima are
not the end of the story. 143 In addition to these base amounts
designed to cover basic living expenses,14 4 the Recofa model follows
the execution law by increasing the debtor's budget for health
insurance premiums and monthly rental 45 housing expenses beyond
certain minimal levels. 146 The Recofa model also increases the
debtor's allowance to meet any childcare expenses not covered by the
employer. The model increases the debtor's allowance by C147 (about
$180) for monthly auto transportation expenses to the extent
necessary for income production, although it recommends using a
moped as a cheaper alternative to a car. 14 7 Adding these additional
allowances likely brings the budgets of many Dutch debtors much
closer to those allowed in surrounding debt relief systems.

141.
Kilborn, German Law, supra note 7, at 286 n.192. These levels were likely
increased for inflation in 2004, as the German law now requires. Id. at 286 n.190.
142.
Kilborn, French Law, supra note 7, at 630 n.79. Note that the Author used
the much higher January 2005 exchange rate of $1.36/€ to calculate the dollar figures
in this earlier article. Id. at 630 n.75.
143.
Even before the Recofa model was released, judges often allocated extra
budget amounts (generally, about $85 per month on average, and sometimes as much
as $500 or more per month) to debtors with higher housing and healthcare expenses.
WODC REPORT, supranote 51, at 85-86, tbl. 20.
144.

REKENMODEL, supra note 131, § 5.10.

145.
The Dutch law is not designed for homebuyers. The Recofa model explicitly
excludes from housing expenses any payment toward a mortgage loan, and it suggests
that in most cases, a debtor-owned home encumbered by a mortgage should be sold
(and presumably the debtor should find rental housing). Id. § 4.8.4. A similar approach
to forced sale of mortgaged homes appears in Belgian consumer debt relief law.
Kilborn, Belgium and Luxembourg, supra note 7, at 25, n.99. This may represent a
significant shortcoming of the WSNP, as the great bulk of indebtedness in the
Netherlands has arisen from mortgage borrowing. NIBUD, FINANCIEEL GEDRAG IN
NEDERLAND, § 3.2 at 9 (2004), available at http://www.nibud.nl/docs/Fingedrag.pdf;
DIDIER DAVYDOFF ET AL., COMITE CONSULTATIF DU CONSEIL NATIONAL DU CREDIT ET DU
TITRE, L'OBSERVATOIRE DE L'EPARGNE EUROPtENNE, LENDETTEMENT DES MENAGES
EUROP9ENS DE 1995 A 2002 §§ 2.2-2.3, 3.3, annex 2 (2004) (on file with author)

(showing housing loans as a greater percent of borrowing in the Netherlands than in
any other European state from 1995 to 2002).
146.
Rental housing expenses increase the "amount to be left free" to the debtor
to the extent they exceed the statutory rent-subsidy level of, on average, €178 per
month (about $220), along with an increase of up to £48 ($60) per month for utilities.
REKENMODEL, supra note 131, §§ 4.8.2.1, 4.8.3; RV art. 475d(5)(b). Although the
execution law generally limits the increase to the amount of the original minimum
level (another C178 or $220 per month), the Recofa model allows for budgeting of full
rental expenses to debtors who are searching for or unable to find or move to cheaper
housing. REKENMODEL, supra note 131, §§ 4.8.2.1, 5.3.
147.
Id. §§ 5.6-5.7.
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3. Payment Plans Part II-How Long?
The WSNP theoretically gives the judge maximum freedom to
design a payment plan with whatever provisions seem "reasonable
and fair."'148 In reality, most plans simply set out the amount of
income left to the debtor over a standard three-year repayment
term. 149 In exceptional circumstances, the court can impose up to a
five-year plan, 150 but only if the debtor is granted a monthly budget
allowance beyond the minimum required by law during the entire
plan period. 151 Plans longer than three years have been rare in the
15 2
first several years of operation of the WSNP.
The maximum duration of imposed payment plans was one of the
most hotly debated topics in the legislature. The government's initial
bill proposed simply that the court should have full discretion to
determine the length of the plan, not to exceed five years. 153 The
Justice Minster explained that this term had been chosen based on
the five-year statute of limitations (the "prescriptive period" in the
civil law) for most contractual obligations. 154 As debate on this topic
heated up, a broad legislative consensus emerged in favor of a
presumptive three-year plan, with the possibility, in exceptional
cases, to extend the plan up to five years; the position came to be
called the "three-years-unless principle." 155 Although the Justice

148.
F art. 343(1); see also Kamerstukken II 1992/93, 22 969, nr. 3, p. 59
(remarking on the broad discretion theoretically allowed to the court).
149.
F art. 343(2); WODC REPORT, supra note 51, at 95, 107, 146. Because most
plans take on this standardized, simple form, the government has proposed reforming
the law to scrap the discretionary plan altogether and adopt a more predictable and
uniform German model: a simple, statutorily established three years on minimum
income leading to conclusion of the case. Kamerstukken II 2004/05, 29 942, nr. 3. pp.
6-7.
150.
The legislature and government suggested that five-year plans might be
imposed, for example, on higher-income debtors (estimated to be 10-20% of all debtors)
who could make payments through the plan yet still retain monthly income above the
social assistance minimum. See, e.g., Kamerstukken H 1994/95, 22 969, nr. 19, p. 5;
Handelingen II 1994/95, nr. 99, pp. 6081-82; Handelingen II 1994/95, nr. 100, pp.
6116-17; Kamerstukken II 1994/95, 22 969, nr. 28, p. 2.
151.
F art. 343(2); see also X/Kemps, Gerechtshof [HOF] [court of ordinary
appeal], Bosch, 2 mei, 2002 (Neth.), available at http://www.wsnp.rvr.org/cgibinIJurisprudentie/preview.cfm?Code-2002-299 (reversing the district court's order
imposing a plan longer than three years without allowing for a greater-than-minimum
budget to the debtor); X/Rompen, Gerechtshof [HOF] [court of ordinary appeal], Bosch,
5 maart, 2002 (Neth.), available at http://www.wsnp.rvr.org/cgi-bin/Jurisprudentie/
preview.cfm?Code=2002-323 (same).
152.
Kamerstukken II 2004/05, 29 942, nr. 3, p. 33.
153.
Kamerstukken II 1992/93, 22 969, nr. 3, pp. 18, 59.
154.
Kamerstukken II 1994/95, 22 969, nr. 19, p. 24.
155.
See, e.g., Kamerstukken II 1994/95, 22 969, nr. 19, pp. 2, 5; Kamerstukken
II 1994/95, 22 969, nr. 23; Handelingen II 1994/95, nr. 99, p. 6073; Kamerstukken II
1994/95, 22 969, nr. 29, p. 1; Handelingen II 1995.96, nr. 4, p. 203; Handelingen I
1997/98, 34, p. 1744.
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Minister urged that the original bill allowed the court discretion to
choose a three-year plan, lawmakers insisted that minimum social
standards should be established by the legislature rather than the
courts. 156
The government finally relented on this point and
157
amended its proposed bill.
Legislators preferred the three-year period because the decades
of credit counseling experience by the GKBs had proven the
effectiveness of the maximum three-year-plan model of the 1979
NVVK code of conduct. 158 Lawmakers emphasized that this model
had been established in large part to avoid recidivism; longer plans
led to flagging motivation by consumer debtors and markedly
increased levels of repeat debt problems. 159 It was suggested that,
especially in light of experience under the NVVK voluntary model,
expecting someone to live longer than three years on the social
assistance minimum would be "from a social point of view not
responsible." 160 Moreover, if creditors knew that a court-imposed
plan would extract five years of income while a consensual
arrangement under the NVVK model would require only three years,
the goal of encouraging more out-of-court workouts would be
undermined. 161 Thus, more than any other influence, the welldeveloped practice of voluntary arrangements in the Netherlands
compelled the adoption of the three-year standard-a much shorter
162
period than in surrounding debt relief systems.

156.
Kamerstukken II 1994/95, 22 969, nr. 19, pp. 5, 24; Kamerstukken II
1994/95, 22 969, nr. 22; Handelingen 11 1994/95, nr. 99, pp. 6077, 6081. This is quite an
ironic statement in light of the debate over the amount to be left free for debtors'
budgets and the eventual takeover of this area of policy by the courts. See supra Part
III.A.2.
157.
Kamerstukken II 1994/95, 22 969, nr. 28.
158.
See supra Part II.B.1.
159.
See, e.g., Kamerstukken II 1994/95, 22 969, nr. 19, pp. 2, 11-12, 14, 18;
Kamerstukken II 1994/95, 22 969, nr. 23; Handelingen II 1994/95, nr. 99, pp. 6075,
6077, 6079, 6081; Handelingen II 1994/95, nr. 100, p. 6133; Kamerstukken 11 1995/96,
22 969, nr. 30, p. 2 ; Kamerstukken I 1995/96 22 969, nr. 34b, p. 7; see also Huls,
Alternatives, supra note 47, at 297.
160.
Kamerstukken II 1994/95, 22 969, nr. 19, p. 5; see also Handelingen II
1994/95, nr. 99, p. 6071.
161.
See, e.g., Kamerstukken II 1994/95, 22 969, nr. 19, p. 5; Handelingen II
1994/95, nr. 99, p. 6081; Handelingen II 1995/96, nr. 4, p. 203.
162.
Oddly, comparative law played very little if any role in the development of
the Dutch system. Only twice in the entire legislative record does a legislator refer to
the considerably longer plan periods of the new systems in neighboring states, as he
asks at one point whether a three year period "feels like fraud" in light of the five and
seven year periods of "surrounding countries." Kamerstukken II 1994/95, 22 969, nr.
19, p. 15; see also Handelingen II 1994/95, nr. 100, p. 6121. This question was
essentially ignored. Although the reference isn't explained, the five- and seven-year
periods come from existing and planned law governing judicial plans in France and
Germany at the time. Kilborn, German Law, supra note 7, at 282-84; Kilborn, French
Law, supra note 7, at 647 n.208. Indeed, before the Dutch bill became law, proposals
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The uniform result of completion of the plan is also established
by law. Upon conclusion of the repayment term, most 163 unpaid
obligations are "no longer enforceable" unless the judge refuses a
discharge 164 after a hearing within one month of the conclusion of the
plan term. 165 The court can refuse a discharge if the debtor has failed
to fulfill an obligation under the WSNP, 166 such as by failing to
inform and cooperate with the trustee or failing to exert maximum
effort to produce income.' 6 7 Though it does happen, 168 Dutch courts

were pending in Belgium and Luxembourg for five- and seven-year maximum plans,
respectively. Kilborn, Belgium and Luxembourg, supra note 7, at 23-26.
163.
The only unsecured debts not subject to discharge are student loans. F art.
299a.
164.
The effect of the Dutch law can be properly called a "discharge," even
though, just like under the U.S. law, "discharge" does not mean the obligations are
destroyed. Under U.S. law, the "discharge injunction" simply prevents creditors from
enforcing the debtor's unpaid obligations. 11 U.S.C. § 524(a) (2005). Similarly, the
Dutch discharge simply makes the unpaid obligations no longer enforceable at law,
although a so-called "natural obligation" remains, morally obliging fulfillment of the
obligations to the extent that the debtor can do so later. F art. 358; Huls, Etat des
lieux, supra note 53, at 156; Kamerstukken II 1992/93, 22 969, nr. 3, pp. 10, 20-22, 66;
Kamerstukken II 2004/05, 29 942, nr. 3, p. 2.
165.
F arts. 352-58.
166.
F art. 354(1).
167.
Although this appears nowhere in the statute, one of the debtor's main
obligations under the WSNP is to exert maximal effort to find and keep work that will
produce the greatest possible distribution to creditors. The Justice Minister stressed
this point in the legislative record, and the Supreme Court recently acknowledged this
duty, albeit in dictum.
Kamerstukken II 1992/93, 22 969, nr. 3, pp. 6, 59;
Kamerstukken II 1997/98, 25 672, nr. 6, p. 9; Hoge Raad (July 12, 2002), § 2.12,
available at http://www.wsnp.rvr.org/cgi-bin/Jurisprudentie/preview.cfm?Code=2002341. The German law, in contrast, explicitly imposes a requirement to find and keep
good work. Kilborn, German Law, supra note 7, at 280-81.
The courts are divided on the extent of this duty, but some debtors are (rarely)
denied a discharge or dismissed early from the WSNP process for failing to exert
themselves sufficiently to find and keep work. The Supreme Court recently rejected an
appeal from a couple denied discharge for failing to make C877.26 of prescribed plan
payments, despite the couple's explanation that the failure was the result of the
husband's losing his job when his employer went bankrupt. Verzoeker, Hoge Raad
[HR] [Supreme Court of the Netherlands], 25 maart 2005, available at
http://www.wsnp.rvr.org/cgi-binlJurisprudentie/preview.cfm?Code=2005AO04;
The
main problem in this case, though, seems to have been failure to communicate this
problem to the trustee (and failure to appear at court hearings) rather than the simple
failure to pay what the plan prescribed. Similarly, the appellate court in Amsterdam
affirmed an early dismissal (without discharge) of a case in which the debtor had
moved to a much lower-paying.job, although the main problem in this case, too, seems
to have been failure to discuss this move with the trustee. X/Rijkelijkhuizen,
Gerechtshof [HOF] [court of ordinary appeal], Amsterdam, 23 augustus 2002, available
at http://www.wsnp.rvr.org/cgi-binlJurisprudentie/preview.cfm?Code=2002-336;
see
also Schuldenaar, Arrondissementsrechtbank [Rb.] [ordinary court of first instance and
court of appeal to the Kantongerecht], Bosch, 10 mei 2004, available at
http://www.wsnp.rvr.org/cgi-bin/Jurisprudentie/preview.cfm?Code=2004-451 (denying a
discharge in the case of an imprisoned debtor, in part because he could not fulfill his
duty to earn income from prison); X/Noppen, Gerechtshof [HOF] [ordinary court of
appeal], Arnhem, 7 september 2000, available at http://www.wsnp.rvr.org/cgi-
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very rarely deny a discharge after the full term of the case has run. 169
For example, in 2003, the Dutch Supreme Court, (Hoge Raad),
affirmed one discharge denial based on the debtor's having concocted
a scheme to conceal from the trustee the fact that he had taken over a
170
part of his employer's repair business.

bin/Jurisprudentie/preview.cfm?Code=2000-191 (rejection a WSNP petition because the
debtor faced a 6-month prison term and could not fulfill her duty to maximize income
during that time). Failure to look for work-at least after the court orders such a
search-might also lead to denial of discharge. B, Gerechtshof [HOF] [ordinary court
of appeal] Bosch, 27 november 2003, available at http://www.wsnp.rvr.org/cgibinlJurisprudentie/preview.cfm?Code=2003-423;
XJR. E.F.,
Gerechtshof
[HOF]
[ordinary court
of appeal]
Arnhem,
11 november
2002,
available at
http://www.wsnp.rvr.org/cgi-binlJurisprudentie/preview.cfm?Code=2002.363;
see also
Khadija D./ Dungen, Gerechtshof [HOF] [ordinary court of appeal] Bosch, 24 juni 2004,
available at http://www.wsnp.rvr.org/cgi-bin/Jurisprudentie/preview.cfm?Code=2004450.
In contrast, however, another appellate court reversed an order of the district court
denying discharge for a wealthy debtor's failure to make all of the plan-prescribed
minimum payments into the estate, even though the debtor had allegedly failed to
attempt to reduce excessive living expenses. X/Goede, Gerechtshof [HOF] [ordinary court
of appeal] Leeuwarden, 29 aug. 2001, available at http://www.wsnp.rvr.org/cgibin/
Jurisprudentie/preview.cfm?Code=2001-278;
reversing X, Arrondissementsrechtbank
[Rb.] [ordinary court of first instance and court of appeal to the Kantongerecht] Assen, 25
jan. 2002, available at http://www.wsnp.rvr.org/cgi-bin/Jurisprudentie/preview.cfm?
Code=2002-284; see also X/Kemps, Gerechtshof [HOF] [ordinary court of appeal] Bosch,
14 mei 2002, available at http://www.wsnp.rvr.org/cgi-bin/Jurisprudentie/preview.cfm?
Code=2002-324 (reversing a denial of discharge for failure to make a sufficient
contribution to the estate).
168.
This conclusion is based on the Author's review of the cases collected in the
extremely helpful database of jurisprudence in the library section of the main WSNP
website, available at http://www.wsnp.rvr.org/frames/fr-bibl.htm (last visited Nov. 14,
2005).
169.
The court might dismiss the case early, however, based on the debtor's
early rehabilitation, failure to fulfill duties under the law, assumption of large debts, or
attempt to harm creditors. F art. 350(3); See, e.g., R.G./M. B.-R., Hoge Raad [HR]
[Supreme
Court
of the Netherlands],
10 januari
2003,
available at
http://www.wsnp.rvr.org/cgi-binlJurisprudentie/preview.cfm?Code=2003-381; Xlvan de
Voort, Gerechtshof [HOF] [ordinary court of appeal] Bosch, 5 maart 2002, available at
http://www.wsnp.rvr.org/cgi-bin/Jurisprudentie/preview.cfm?Code=2002-322.
In 2003,
5% of the 7,700 cases that ended that year concluded (probably early) with a negative
result, and in 2004, that number rose to 20%. CBS Stats 2003, supra note 98; CBS
Stats 2004, supra note 98.
170.
HR
20
June
2003,
available at
http://www.wsnp.rvr.org/cgibin/Jurisprudentie/preview.cfm?Code=2003-405 (last visited Nov. 14, 2005).
The
debtor had his son take over the inventory and goodwill of the business and employ the
debtor 20-25 hours per week, although the son was fully employed elsewhere and had
no intention of entering the repair business, and the debtor acted as the main contact
person for the business. REKENMODEL, supra note 131, § 3.2.

106

4.

VANDERBIL TJOURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LAW

[VOL. 39.'77

Self-Financing the Trustee's Fee or Avoiding It In Simplified
Proceedings: The Real "Stick Behind the Door"

Trustees need to be reasonably remunerated for the laborintensive processes of monitoring the debtor, collecting and
distributing income, and reporting to the court for three years. The
Dutch legislature chose a largely self-financing structure to cover the
trustee's fees, which also enhances the "stick behind the door" goal of
encouraging creditors to agree to voluntary arrangements and avoid
the in-court process. If creditors reject a voluntary arrangement, and
the case goes to court, all publication costs and most of the trustee's
fee 171 are paid from estate assets and income that would otherwise be
17 2
distributed to creditors.
Until recently, the trustee received only about $25 per month
from the estate-about $900 over a three-year plan-for
administering each debtor's case. 173 To strengthen the "stick behind
the door" effect 174 and improve trustee quality, in 2004 the trustee's
fee was nearly doubled to €37 (about $45) per month-about $1,600
over a three-year plan period. 175 This may well improve trustee
recruiting and retention, but the voluntary plan process has
remained moribund. Recall that both the absolute number and the
rate of voluntary plans fell rather sharply in 2004 according to recent
NVVK data-from 5300 (15%) in 2003 to 3500 (9%) in 2004.176
Apparently, if creditors are faced with a 60% loss in the voluntary
process, they are more than willing to accept an even greater loss in
the in-court process.
As a result of the priority payment from the estate of the
trustee's salary and substantial publication costs, 1 77 most Dutch

171.
Trustees are remunerated in two ways. In addition to the monthly salary
distribution from the estate, trustees receive a per-case subsidy and limited expense
reimbursement from government funds. This subsidy has risen periodically from its
original level of about $625 per case, and it stands today at between C1,000 and C2,400
($1,250 and $3,000), depending upon whether the case is single or joint and whether or
not the debtor is an ex-entrepreneur. WSNP en euro, WSNP UPDATE, no. 25 (Dec.
2001), available at http://www.wsnp.rvr.orgwsnpindex2.html (follow "Bibliotheek"
hyperlink; then follow "Nieuswsbrief Update Wsnp" hyperlink; then follow "nr 25
December 2001" hyperlink) (last visited Nov. 14, 2005); Order of Feb. 6, 2001, Stb.
2001, 80, available at http://www.wsnp.rvr.org/bibliotheek/data/besluiten/subsbew_
besl.htm; Order of June 20, 2002, Stcrt. 2002, 119, at 10.
172.
F art. 320(7).
173.
Kamerstukken II 1997/98, 25 672, nr. 3, p. 3; Order of July 15, 1998, art. 2,
Stb. 1998, 477 (setting the salary at fifty gilders per month); Order of Feb. 6, 2001, Stb.
2001, 81 (same).
174.
See, e.g., Kamerstukken II 2004/05, 29 942, nr. 6, p. 5.
175.
Order of Aug. 3, 2004, Stb. 2004, 391.
176.
See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
177.
Before 2005, publication in local and national newspapers could cost as
much as $2,500 per case. WODC REPORT, supra note 51, at 151. These costs will fall
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plans thus far have been purely symbolic, offering little or nothing to
creditors. One prominent study revealed that, of the two-thirds of
surveyed cases filed in 1999 and 2000 for which payment capacity
was known, 56% could pay only the $25 trustee fee or less per month;
another 25% could pay only between $25 and $125 per month, and
178
another 9% could pay only between $125 and $250 per month.
Deducting the trustee's fee, even these few higher-income debtors
could pay creditors only about $7,500 over a three-year plan.
Creditors complained in the early years of the new law that only
about 20% of cases held hearings to verify creditors' claims and plan
1 79
any distribution to creditors.
Legislators anticipated from the very beginning that many
debtors would be unable to pay anything substantial beyond the
trustee's fee,' 8 0 and they provided for a fast-track simplified
procedure for extreme cases. If one year after the opening of the case
the debtor still has neither assets nor sufficient available future
income potential to produce a distribution to creditors, the trustee
can issue a declaration to the effect that "it is not reasonably
anticipated that the debtor can fulfill his or her obligations in full or
in part."''
On the basis of this declaration, the court can end the
process and grant the debtor an immediate discharge. 8 2 The law
allows the court to withhold judgment for further observation of the
debtor, 8 3 and courts seem to be applying this one-year provision
quite cautiously despite the significant numbers of "can't pay"
debtors. One prominent study suggested that courts were holding
back on these one-year discharges "to create societal support" for the
new law in its early years. 18 4 Nonetheless, courts ended 4% of cases
with discharges already between 1999 and 2001,185 well before these
cases would have concluded on the normal three-year track.

significantly as internet publication replaces print publication by mid-2005. Law of 24
Nov. 2004, Stb. 2004, 615; Order of 30 Dec. 2004, Stb. 2005, 10; Faillissementswet
aangepast, WSNP UPDATE, no. 36 (Apr. 2005), available at http://www.wsnp.rvr.org/
wsnpindex2.html (follow "Bibliotheek" hyperlink; then follow "Nieuswsbrief Update
Wsnp" hyperlink; then follow "nr 36 April 2005" hyperlink) (last visited Nov. 14, 2005).
178.
WODC REPORT, supra note 51, at 86, tbl. 20. Another 10% of debtors could
pay $250-$1350 per month.
179.
Id. at 119.
180.
Kamerstukken II 1992/93, 22 969, nr. 3, p. 10; Handelingen II 1994/95, nr.
99, pp. 6083-84; Handelingen II 1994/95, nr. 100, p. 6118; Kamerstukken II 1997/98,
25 672, nr. 3, p. 5; Kamerstukken I 1997/98, 22 969, nr. 297, p. 5.
181.
F art. 352(2).
182.
Id.
183.
184.

F art. 354(3).
WODC REPORT, supra note 51, at 147.

185.
Id. at 72, tbl. 9 (reporting 415 of 15,254 total cases ended with a discharge
in 1999 and 2000); Instroom 2001, WSNP UPDATE, no. 26 (Mar. 2002), available at
http://www.wsnp.rvr.org/ wsnpindex2.html (follow "Bibliotheek" hyperlink; then follow
"Nieuswsbrief Update Wsnp" hyperlink; then follow "nr 26 Maart 2002" hyperlink)
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In a recent reform proposal, the government has proposed
expanding this simplified proceeding to cases in which some
distribution might be made to creditors, but the amount is so small

'186
that continuation on the usual three-year track is "not justified.
18
7
Following recent similar developments in France,
the Dutch
system seems to be abandoning the "payment morality" function of
economically wasteful payment plans where debtors have no hope of
both paying administrative costs and substantially paying down their
debts.

5.

Getting Comfortable With the WSNP: Rising Filings Year After
Year

After an initial period of hesitancy, Dutch debtors continue to
flock to the WSNP in increasing numbers year after year.
Lawmakers originally anticipated around 12,000 WSNP filings per
year, 188 but that barrier was broken only last year. On the heels of a
relatively slow start, with only about 6,300 filings in 1999, the
number of "definitive"'1 9 new case openings jumped 36% in 2000 to
over 8,600 and remained at that level in 2001.190

New filings rose

about 10% in each of 2002 and 2003 before shooting up nearly 32% in
2004, to just under 14,000-about 8.6 filings for every 10,000 Dutch
residents. 19 1 Thus, the Dutch filing rate is now on par with the rate
in neighboring Belgium (nine filings per 10,000), although it still lags
far behind the filing rates in France (twenty-seven filings per 10,000)
and the United States (fifty-five filings per 10,000).192

The 3,708

(last visited Nov. 14, 2005) (reporting 477 cases ended with discharge in 2001, which
brings the 1999-2001 total to 892 of about 23,750 cases initiated in those three years).
186.
Kamerstukken II 2004/05, 29 942, nr. 3, pp. 5-6, 36-37 (suggesting that an
expected distribution of less than 2% of creditors' claims would trigger this new
provision).
187.
The unique simplified process in the Dutch law and its restricted
application resemble the recently adopted procedure of personal recovery under the
French law. Kilborn, French Law, supra note 7, at 655-61.
188.
Kamerstukken II 1997/98, 25 672, B, p. 3; Kamerstukken II 1997/98, 25
672, nr. 3, p. 3; Handelingen I 1997/98, 34, p. 1741.
189.
"Definitive" case openings exclude the few cases opened "provisionally" in
anticipation of future information or to deal with exigent circumstances. F art. 287(2),
(4)-(8). The provisional case opening procedure has been used in only about one in
seventeen cases. Kamerstukken II 2004/05, 29 942, nr. 3, pp. 7-8.
190.
For a constantly updated table of bankruptcy and WSNP definitive case
opening information, see Uitgesproken faillissementen en schuldsaneringen, Centraal
Bureau voor de Statistiek, (2005), available at http://statline.cbs.nlStatWeb/
Table.asp?STB=G1&LA=nl&DM=SLNL&PA=37289&Dl=a&D2=a&HDR=T&TT=2
(last visited Nov. 14, 2005) [hereinafter Uitgesproken].
The table reports 6360
"definitively" opened cases in 1999, 8669 in 2000, and 8678 in 2001.
191.
Id. (reporting 9,479 cases opened in 2002, 10,587 in 2003, and 13,969 in
2004); CBS Stats 2004, supra note 103 (reporting the 8.6/10,000 rate).
192.
Kilborn, Belgium and Luxembourg, supra note 7, at 35.
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filings in the first quarter of 2005,193 however, exceed the number of
first-quarter filings in 2004 by nearly 8%, putting the system on track
194
to reach nearly 15,000 by year's end.
B. Consumer Bankruptcy Reform (Restriction) in the United States
Just as the Dutch bankruptcy law was taking on a more liberal
or debtor-friendly approach to discharging unpaid consumer debts,
the U.S. Congress was preparing to shift U.S. policy toward a more
restrictive European model of requiring more debtors to pay. Before
1996, Congress appeared uninterested in amending the U.S.
consumer bankruptcy system.
That changed when the
Administrative Office of U.S. Courts released data revealing that,
during a time of remarkable general economic vitality, the total
number of bankruptcy filings had for the first time exceeded one
million in 1996.195 A cry immediately arose over a supposed decline
in the stigma of bankruptcy and over abuse of the system by
irresponsible consumers seeking an easy escape from their
obligations.
In September 1997, the first of many bills was
introduced in Congress that proposed to reform the consumer
bankruptcy system by, among other things, requiring a Chapter 13
payment plan as a prerequisite for relief for debtors with "excess"
disposable income. An eight year struggle ensued in which bills
received supermajority support in both houses of Congress but failed
for one reason or another year after year. 196 Finally, on April 20,
2005, President Bush signed a bill into law. 197 Most of the provisions
of the new law became effective on October 17, 2005.198

193.
Uitgesproken, supra note 190.
194.
This continuous rise in filings and the attendant administrative workload
have prompted the first reform proposal, currently pending in the Second Chamber.
Echoing similar complaints in the United States, see infra Part II.B., the Justice
Minister has warned that numerous filings might undermine public support for the
new law, so the government has proposed, among other things, imposing heightened
restrictions on access to the system. Kamerstukken II 2004/05, 29 942, nr. 3. The
"restricted access" aspect of the reform proposal received a cold reception in the Second
Chamber, Kamerstukken II 2004/05, 29 942, nr. 6, although other aspects of the
reform, see, e.g., supra notes 149 (scrapping the "discretionary" model and adopting a
standard three-year plan) and 185 (extending application of fast-track one-year plans),
seem likely to pass in coming months.
195.
For the sources of all of the factual assertions in this paragraph, and for a
thorough analysis of the history of U.S. bankruptcy reform between 1996 and early
2004, see Melissa B. Jacoby, Negotiating Bankruptcy Legislation Through the News
Media, 41 HOUSTON L. REV. 1091, 1095-1106 (2004); see also H.R. Rep. No. 109-31, at

6-10 (Apr. 8, 2005), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi.bin/cpquery/z?cpl09:
hr31.109:.
196.
Jacoby, supra note 195.
197.
Press Release, White House, President Signs Bankruptcy Abuse
Prevention,
Consumer
Protection
Act
(Apr.
20,
2005),
available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/04/20050420-5.html.
The Bankruptcy
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Unwittingly, Congress and the President have restructured the
U.S. consumer bankruptcy system to parallel the Dutch system in
many central respects. The 512-page law makes numerous changes
to current law and practice, 199 but the most important revisions are
particularly noteworthy for the extent to which they echo elements of
the Dutch system-sometimes in surprising ways. Dutch experience
sheds useful light on the future of the radically reformed U.S.
consumer bankruptcy system. This Part focuses on two particularly
revealing areas of comparison with Dutch law and practice: pre-court
payment plan negotiations and in-court payment plan budget levels.
1.

Required Pre-Bankruptcy Credit
Negotiations in Sheep's Clothing

Counseling-Out-of-Court

One seemingly innocuous provision of the new law may have the
most substantial effect. Under the revised U.S. Bankruptcy Code, an
individual can seek relief under any chapter of the Code only after
having received "an individual or group briefing (including a briefing
conducted by telephone or on the Internet) that outlined the
opportunities for available credit counseling and assisted such
individual in performing a related budget analysis" within 180 days
before the bankruptcy filing. 20 0 At first glance, this provision seems
to require little more than disclosure of "opportunities" for credit
counseling and "assistance" in analyzing a budget, explicitly
suggesting that a quick telephone call or reference to an internet site
201
might suffice.
In fact, this simple provision might well radically alter how
individuals seek and receive debt relief in the United States. The law
will, de facto, require many (if not most) debtors to negotiate an out-

Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 was assigned Public Law
number 109-8.
198.
Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 1501 (2005) (making most provisions effective 180 days
after enactment).
199.
For a description of the major consumer amendments implemented by the
reform law, see EUGENE R. WEDOFF, MAJOR CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY EFFECTS OF THE
2005 REFORM LEGISLATION (2005), available at http://www.abiworld.org/pdfs/
s256/mainpoints8.pdf.
200.
11 U.S.C. § 109(h)(1) (2005) (as amended by Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 106(a)).
The law allows for certain exceptions; e.g., for debtors in districts where public officials
have declared that insufficient credit counseling is available, or debtors whose
"incapacity, disability, or active military duty in a military combat zone" prevents their
obtaining such counseling. Id. § 109(h)(2)-(4). These exceptions are narrow and, in my
view, are likely to be interpreted and applied very narrowly.
201.
One can easily imagine a series of two or three handouts or internet pages
that would fulfill these requirements-page one might list the addresses and telephone
numbers of local counseling agencies and discuss briefly what they do, and pages two
and three might describe an average household budget with estimated average local
expenses and prompt debtors to compare their budgets with the model.

2006J

DUTCH AND US. CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY

of-court repayment plan (DMP) with creditors, just as Dutch law
requires it de jure. This result will follow from the mandatory source
of the required "briefing" and the unique financial structure of
consumer credit counseling in the U.S.
Individuals cannot receive the required briefing from any source
that offers a simple web page or recorded telephone message, but
must go to "an approved nonprofit budget and credit counseling
agency described in [new] section 111(a). ' 20 2 To be approved, a
counseling provider must do much more than simply make available
the briefing required by the new law: it must offer general counseling
by trained and experienced counselors on the sources of and
appropriate solutions for each individual debtor's financial
difficulties, and must also "provide for safekeeping and payment of
client funds, including an annual audit of the trust accounts and
appropriate employee bonding."20 3 As it turns out, it is not enough to
provide a briefing on opportunities for credit counseling and budget
analysis. The provider itself must be equipped to offer professional
counseling and guidance services, possibly including facilities for the
intake and distribution of client funds-i.e., servicing DMP payment
204
plans.
Just as German and Dutch debtors must file a certificate,
generally issued by credit counselors, attesting to failure of their outof-court negotiations, 20 5 the new law requires U.S. individual debtors
to file with their petitions a certificate "from the approved nonprofit
budget and credit counseling agency" that provided the required
briefing. 20 6 The certificate must describe the credit counseling
services provided to the debtor, clearly implying that more than a
briefing is intended. The law is silent on what requirements, if any,
20 7
credit counselors can impose on the issuance of these certificates.

202.
11 U.S.C. § 109(h)(1) (2005) (as amended by Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 106(a)).
203.
Id. § 111(c)(2)(C), (E), and (F) (2005) (as amended by Pub. L. No. 109-8,
§ 106(e)(1)).
204.
Although this seems to be at odds with the law, the U.S. Trustee's
application for counselor approval suggests that not all counseling agencies need to be
equipped to administer payment plans. Executive Office for United States Trustees,
Instructions for Application for Approval as a Nonprofit Budget and Credit Counseling
Agency
4
(2005),
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/ust/bapcpa/ccde/docs/BCC

ApplicationInstructions.pdf (suggesting that the DMP administration section "applies
only to Agencies offering debt management plans").
205.
See supra notes 94-95 and accompanying text; Kilborn, German Law,
supra note 7, at 273 & n.83.
206.
11 U.S.C. § 521(b)(1) (2005) (as amended by Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 106(d)).
207.
In contrast to the Dutch law, the U.S. law does not clearly require
counselors to cooperate with debtors and issue such certificates. Cf. F art. 285(4);
Kamerstukken II 1997/98, 25 672, B, p. 2; Kamerstukken II 1997/98, 25 672, nr. 3, p. 4.
Counseling agencies in the United States are apparently free to impose whatever
requirements they wish for issuance of the required certificates.
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Credit counseling agencies can be expected to make every effort
to push debtors into out-of-court payment plans-possibly even
requiring an attempted payment plan as a condition to issuance of
the required certificate.
Given the financial structure of credit
counseling in the United States, counseling agencies are trapped in a
patent conflict between their own survival and their pre-bankruptcy
clients' interests.
A combination of statutory fee restrictions, waning creditor
financing, and a lack of governmental support will all but force credit
counselors to squeeze revenue from their consumer debtor clients.
The new law requires approved counseling agencies to charge no
more than a "reasonable" fee for their services and to "provide
services without regard to ability to pay the fee."' 20 8 As a result, basic
per-case intake fees might not defray operating costs for counseling
agencies. The traditional alternative source of financial support for
counseling is in sharp decline.
As discussed above, 20 9 credit
counselors in the United States are largely funded by creditors, who
have heavily scaled back their financial support in recent years. If
Congress expects the credit counseling industry to act as watchdogs
over the entryway to the bankruptcy system, it should adequately
compensate counselors. The Dutch parliament, for example, allocated
substantial financial support to local credit counseling agencies in
connection with their new role under the consumer bankruptcy
law. 2 10
The U.S. Congress, in contrast, imposed an unfunded
mandate on these already financially strapped agencies.
Thus, to service a flood of pre-bankruptcy clients, counseling
agencies will have to funnel as many debtors as possible into the one
reliable source of funding they have: servicing fees and other creditor
incentives associated with DMPs. 211 Credit counselors earn very
little for clients directed immediately into bankruptcy, so they can be
expected to continue their current practice of shunning bankruptcy
and steering as many debtors as possible into DMPs, even in cases
where payment plans are clearly destined for failure.212

208.
11 U.S.C. § 11(c)(2)(B) (2005) (as amended by Pub. L. No. 109-8,
§ 106(e)(1)).
209.
See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
210.
In enacting the WSNP, the Dutch federal government allocated 15 million
gilders (about $7.5 million) for financing local counseling activities, in addition to 10
million gilders (about $5 million) of extra funding for the courts and the initial
implementation costs for the new law. See Kamerstukken II 1997/98, 25 672, B, p. 3;
Kamerstukken II 1997/98, 25 672, nr. 3, pp. 3, 6-7.
211.
See supra notes 31-37 and accompanying text.
212.
CREDIT COUNSELING IN CRISIS, supra note 31, at 23-25 (noting recent
NFCC reports of a 26% completion rate and arguing that counseling agencies "are
loathe to discuss bankruptcy with consumers because they do not make any money on
these consumers"); AICCCA Consumer Credit Counseling Code of Practice § 9(B)(3)
(2003), available at http://www.aiccca.org/mbrdocs/Code of Practice.doc (last visited
Nov. 15, 2005) (requiring counselors to "[p]rovid[e] a DMP to clients as an alternative
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Congress apparently anticipated and perhaps even intended this
result. Although no mention of "debt repayment plans" appears
anywhere in the provision that introduces the counseling
requirement, an amendment to a different section of law requires the
debtor to file "the debt repayment plan, if any, developed... through
the approved nonprofit budget and counseling agency. '213 Thus, both
as a matter of legislative intent and as a matter of likely practical
implementation, the required credit counseling in the new law
actually represents a sub silentio, backdoor adoption of required outof-court payment plan negotiations, much like the explicit
requirement of Dutch law.
a. An Impending Spike in Waiting Periods
The analogous Dutch experience with required counselorsupported, pre-court negotiations is instructive: U.S. debtors will
likely have to wait longer to receive needed relief. Even for those
U.S. debtors who already would have obtained credit counseling
before considering bankruptcy, a flood of new clients will surely
produce waiting periods for the mandatory counseling.
Experts
predict that, with passage of the counseling requirement, "the rising
'2 14
tide of Americans seeking credit counseling will become a flood.
Counseling agencies in the United States will likely face at least the
two- to six-month waiting periods of most Dutch counseling
centers. 215 Even before the impending flood of new pre-bankruptcy
clients, the ratio of those seeking counseling to the number of
counseling offices in the United States is comparable to if not smaller
than the ratio in the Netherlands. 216 Perhaps the significant market
for consumer credit counseling will attract more entrants to the

to bankruptcy"); Lea Krivinskas, "Don't File!" Rehabilitating Unauthorized Practice
Law-Based Policies in the Credit Counseling Industry, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 51, 56, 64-67
(2005).
213.
11 U.S.C. § 521(b)(2) (as amended by Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 106(d)).
214.

CREDIT COUNSELING IN CRISIS, supra note 28, at 31; see also CONSUMER

REPORTS, supra note 45 (reporting on the prediction by noted consumer credit expert
Robert Manning that requests for credit counseling will increase by at least one-third
within a year of passage of the new law, and counselors will be "absolutely
overwhelmed").
215.
See supra notes 94-97 and accompanying text.
216.
In the United States, estimates suggest that approximately 8,000
counseling offices service between 3 and 9 million clients annually-between 375 and
1,125 clients per office per year. See supra note 31 and accompanying text. In the
Netherlands in 2004, approximately sixty-seven members of the NVVK handled
around 39,000 requests for counseling-582 requests per agency (which may be divided
among a number of offices for some of these agencies). See supra note 101; OVERZICHT
VAN

DE INSTELLINGEN

DIE

LID ZIJN

VAN DE NEDERLANDSE

VERENIGING

VOOR

VOLKSKREDIET, available at http://www.volkskrediet.nll (last visited Nov. 1, 2005)
(listing members).
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industry, including debtor lawyers, but such a change would take
time; waiting periods will likely be a problem for some time.
Moreover, as counselors urge more and more debtors to negotiate
payment plans, Dutch experience suggests that the plan negotiation
217
process will add months to the wait.
One other provision, unique to the new U.S. law, will exacerbate
the burden on counselors and the ensuing waiting periods for
consumers. In addition to requiring "credit counseling" before debtors
file for relief, the new law requires debtors to complete "an
instructional course concerning personal financial management"
before they receive a discharge at the end of a case under either
This seemingly well-intentioned
Chapter 7 or Chapter 1 3 . 218
provision seems to respond to the desire, voiced repeatedly by
lawmakers in the Netherlands, for "integrated" counseling as part of
the debt relief system. 219 Dutch legislators noted numerous times
that part of the problem is that some consumers have trouble
handling and budgeting money, 220 so the U.S. move to add a predischarge counseling requirement seems to be a relatively positive,
albeit small step, in preventing future problems. On the other hand,
the law sets few clear criteria for evaluating the content of these
required courses 221 ; already overwhelmed counselors will fall even
farther behind as they undertake financial management training in
addition to credit counseling for all debtors.
b.

The Gloomy Outlook for DMPs In Light of Comparable Dutch
Success Rates: a Cost-Benefit Imbalance?

Dutch experience also strongly suggests that few, if any, debtors
will be successfully diverted from bankruptcy by required credit
counseling.
This Author has suggested before that requiring a
European-style voluntary plan negotiation stage would produce little
success in the United States,2 22 and the Dutch experience confirms
this suspicion. Careful study of the out-of-court plan negotiation
process in the Netherlands indicates that creditors systematically
2 23
reject plans offering less than about a 40% payout over three years.

217.
See supra notes 96-97 and accompanying text.
218.
11 U.S.C. §§ 727(a)(11), 1328(g) (as amended by Pub. L. No. 109-8,
§§ 106(b), (c)).
219.
See, e.g., Kamerstukken II 1997/98, 25 672, nr. 3, p. 2; Kamerstukken II
2004/05, 29 942, nr. 6, pp. 2, 9-10 (recommending, among other things, budget
counseling during the plan period).
220.
See, e.g., Kamerstukken II 1994/95, 22 969, nr. 19, pp. 2, 13-14;
Handelingen II 1994/95, nr. 99, p. 6075; Handelingen I 1997/98, nr. 61, p. 4580.
221.
11 U.S.C. § 111(d) (as amended by Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 106(e)(1)).
222.
Kilborn, German Law, supra note 7, at 292-94; Kilborn, French Law, supra
note 7, at 666-69.
223.
See supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text.
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Empirical studies show that few U.S. debtors in the bankruptcy
system could hope to offer such a dividend given their income,
reasonable expenses, and debts. 224 Moreover, U.S. creditors have
historically required a 100% return of principal, and credit counselors
in the United States have already begun to report declining
cooperation in recent years by creditors in the plan-negotiation
process. 2 25 The dismal and falling success rate of the mandated
Dutch voluntary plan process 2 26 is a harbinger of near certain failure
of the similar U.S. process. Thus, Congress has imposed on every
U.S. debtor a time- and labor-intensive process that will prove
completely superfluous in the vast majority of cases.
c. The Miniature New U.S. "Stick Behind the Door"
Buried in the new U.S. law is one provision apparently designed
to compel creditors to cooperate in the all-but-doomed out-of-court
plan negotiation process. Dutch law similarly has sought from the
beginning to enhance the out-of-court agreement process with a "stick
behind the door," threatening creditors with much smaller returns in
the in-court plan process. 227 The failure of the Dutch "stick behind
the door" effect demonstrates, however, how utterly ineffective this
new provision of U.S. law will be.
In a section entitled "Promotion of Alternative Dispute
Resolution," the new U.S. law adds a provision allowing the court to
reduce a creditor's claim if that creditor "unreasonably refused to
negotiate a reasonable alternative repayment schedule proposed on
behalf of the debtor by an approved nonprofit budget and credit
counseling agency. ' 228 This provision confirms Congress' intention
that debtors receive not only a briefing on credit counseling

224.
See, e.g., Teresa A. Sullivan, Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence Westbrook,
Twenty-First Century Bankruptcy: Two Decades of Evidence About Consumer Debt
and The Stigma of Bankruptcy (unpublished manuscript on file with Author). This
report on the latest installment from the famous Consumer Bankruptcy Study reveals
that U.S. debtors in 2001 were in even worse financial shape than their counterparts in
previous decades. Annual income levels remained low (mean $26,982, median
$24,006), and unsecured debt levels were way up (mean $34,425, median $20,450), not
to mention a significant increase in longer-term secured debt. See id. at 5-6, 9, tbl. la.
Consequently, debt-to-income ratios had also risen sharply (mean 4.63, median 2.3),
including the crucial ratio of non-mortgage debt to income (mean 2.12, median 1.17).
See id. at 9-11, tbls. 2-3. Thus, the average debtor would have to dedicate all income
for over a year to pay off unsecured debts in full. Taking into account taxes, secured
debt service, and reasonable living expenses for these debtors, only a very few might
have hoped to offer a 40% or greater distribution to unsecured creditors in a voluntary
three- to five-year out-of-court payment plan.
225.
See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
226.
See supra notes 98-103 and accompanying text.
227.
See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
228.
11 U.S.C. § 502(k)(1)(A) (as amended by Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 201(a)).
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opportunities before filing, but that they are urged into out-of-court
payment plans by approved credit counseling agencies.
It also
confirms, however, Congress' unrealistic understanding of the giveand-take element of the out-of-court negotiation process.
This "stick" is whittled away to virtually nothing by three
caveats and limitations. First, the offer of a reasonable alternative
repayment schedule must have been made at least sixty days before
the debtor's bankruptcy filing. 2 29
Creditors are free to refuse
reasonable offers in compromise if the debtor files for bankruptcy
shortly after the refusal. Of course, debtors are not likely to wait
sixty days to file for bankruptcy relief after a creditor has rejected
their attempt to settle out of court. Second, the debtor must have
offered to pay at least 60% of the creditor's claim within a reasonable
extension of the original contractual repayment period. 230 Given skyhigh U.S. debt levels and stagnant income, few debtors are likely to
be able to offer 60% payment without a substantial repayment period,
which would likely exceed a reasonable extension.
Finally, the U.S. "stick" turns out to be not particularly
menacing.
As punishment for having unreasonably refused to
negotiate a 40% remission of debt, the creditor faces reduction of its
claim by a maximum of only 20%.231 The Dutch "stick" often reduces
payout to creditors to nothing, yet creditors still refuse to be swayed
for a variety of economic and non-economic reasons. 23 2 One can
hardly imagine that the threat of losing 20% of the creditor's claim
will promote alternative dispute resolution that would not already
have been successful.
This provision is a blatantly half-hearted attempt to hold
creditors responsible for their own economically irrational and
irresponsible refusal to negotiate out of court-refusals that have
become quite common in recent years. 23 3
Dutch legislators
repeatedly acknowledged and sought to address the responsibility of
creditors for creating excessive demands on the bankruptcy system by
refusing reasonable economic compromises. 234 It is a shame that the
U.S. Congress has refused to do likewise.

229.
Id. § 502(k)(1)(B)(i) (as amended by Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 201(a)).
230.
Id. § 502(k)(1)(B)(ii) (as amended by Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 201(a)).
231.
Id. § 502(k)(1) (as amended by Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 201(a)).
232.
See supra notes 173-76 and accompanying text.
233.
CONSUMER REPORTS, supra note 46.
234.
See, e.g., Kamerstukken II 2004/05, 29 942, nr. 6, pp. 9, 18; Kamerstukken
II 2001/02, 28 258, nr. 5, p. 4; Kamerstukken II 2001/02, 28 258, nr. 3, p. 2;
Kamerstukken II 1994/95, 22 969, nr. 19, pp. 2, 12-13; Handelingen II 1994/95, nr. 99,
p. 6078-79.
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The Means Test, Restricted Payment-Plan Budgets, and an
Intense Monitoring Burden for Trustees

"The heart of the [new law's] consumer bankruptcy reforms '235 is
the "means test," which is designed to force more debtors out of quick
Chapter 7 relief and into Chapter 13 payment plans. 236 Reasonable
estimates indicate, however, that few debtors will be denied access to
Chapter 7, just as relatively few debtors actually pay anything to
creditors in the Netherlands. For higher-income debtors forced into
payment plans under the new U.S. system, though, the means test
imposes a strictly regulated budget in much the same way as Dutch
law and practice do. Careful comparison of the new U.S. law with
recent Dutch payment plan practice reveals two important
observations: the mandated U.S. budget is comparatively meager for
most debtors, but judges can alter the system fundamentally to fix
perceived imbalances.
a. Means Testing: Many Apply, Few Are Selected
Another striking similarity between the U.S. and Dutch laws
remains: despite the seemingly demanding nature of both, few
debtors will in fact pay anything to creditors. Although the Dutch
law technically requires all debtors to submit at least three years of
income to their creditors, most debtors can produce nothing more
than the trustee's fees, and some cases conclude with a discharge
after only one year. 23 7 Most Dutch debtors simply bide their time
until discharge at the conclusion of their cases. This is also true now
in the United States, as most debtors obtain relief in a few months
under Chapter 7, and this will remain true despite the new and
23 8
apparently more rigorous means test.
Analytically, the means test consists of two parts, 23 9 each of
which exempts large groups of debtors from imposed payment plans.
In part one, the debtor's (and spouse's) "current monthly income" 240 is
multiplied by twelve and compared with the inflation-adjusted

235.
H.R. Rep. No. 109-31, at 2 (2005) (Conf. Rep.).
236.
For a discussion of Chapter 13 and payment-plan practice under current
law, see supra notes 23-28 and accompanying text.
237.
See supra notes 177-85 and accompanying text.
238.
Todd Zywicki, Bankrupt Criticisms: The Bankruptcy Bill Deserves to Pass,
NATIONAL REVIEW ONLINE, Mar. 15, 2005, available at http://www.nationalreview.com/
comment/zywicki200503150744.asp (last visited Nov. 1, 2005).
239.
The test is not formally divided into two parts in the law, but for ease of
comprehension, I have divided it into what I see as its two logical components.
240.
The word "current" here is a misnomer, and this entire phrase is a term of
art. "Current monthly income" under the new law is defined as the average of the
debtor's monthly income over the past six months. 11 U.S.C. § 101(10A) (as amended
by Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 102(b)).
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median family income of a household of the same size as the debtor's
in the debtor's state. 24 1 Only debtors with above-median income are
subject to the rest of the means test and a potential imposed payment
plan. 242 For example, the 2005 inflation-adjusted median income for
a single debtor in Louisiana-one of the poorest U.S. states-is
approximately $30,000, and approximately $50,000 for a family of
four.24 3
One would expect, and empirical survey data have
confirmed, 244 that few U.S. debtors seeking bankruptcy relief have
income above these averages; thus, this first stage of the means test
will likely eliminate most debtors immediately, freeing them to seek
quick Chapter 7 relief.
In part two, debtors subtract a series of expenses from their
above-average monthly income to see whether significant disposable
income is available for creditors. As discussed in greater detail
below, 245 debtors are allowed to deduct a standard allowance for
monthly food, clothing, and general household expenses, as well as
housing and transportation expenses up to a standard maximum
established for each debtor's locale. 24 6 In addition to these standard
expenses, debtors can deduct the amounts that they would otherwise
pay in a five-year, in-court payment plan to secured and preferred
creditors and the trustee's administrative fee, as well as a few other
specific exceptional expenses. 247 The means test denies the debtor
access to Chapter 7 only if the remainder of the debtor's income after
all of these deductions would allow the debtor to pay creditors at least
24 8
$6,000 over an imposed five-year plan ($100 per month).

241.
Id. § 707(b)(6)-(7) (as amended by Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 102(a)).
242.
To be precise, the "means test" is simply an interpretive gloss on a section
that provides for dismissal of the debtor's case for "abuse." Id. § 707(b). If the debtor
"passes" either part of the means test, abuse is not presumed based on ability to pay,
the debtor need not attempt a repayment plan under Chapter 13, and the debtor's
(Chapter 7) case may be dismissed only for some other kind of abuse. Id. § 707(b)(1).
243.
The state medians from the 2000 Census (reporting 1999 data) are
available from the Census Bureau's website, http://www.census.gov/census2000/states
(last visited Nov. 1, 2005); and changes in inflation as measured by the Consumer Price
Index for All Urban Consumers (CPI-U) are available on the website of the Bureau of
Labor Statistics, http://www.bls.gov/cpi/home.htm (last visited Nov. 1, 2005).
244.
See, e.g., Sullivan, Warren & Westbrook, supra note 224; TERESA A.
SULLIVAN, ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, AS WE FORGIVE OUR
DEBTORS:
BANKRUPTCY AND CONSUMER CREDIT IN AMERICA (1989); TERESA A.
SULLIVAN, ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, THE FRAGILE MIDDLE
CLASS: AMERICANS IN DEBT (2000).
245.
See infra Part III.B.2.b.
246.
11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I) (as amended by Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 102(a)).
247.
Id. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(II)-(V), (iii)-(iv) (as amended by Pub. L. No. 109-8,
§ 102(a)).
248.
Id. § 707(b)(2)(A)(i) (as amended by Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 102(a)). The test is
actually more complex than this, as debtors with more than $24,000 in unsecured debt
can be denied access only if they can pay 25% of their unsecured debt, which is more
than $6,000 over a five-year plan. Id. If the debtor can pay $10,000 over a 5-year plan
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Given these exemptions and deductions, even the most hawkish
supporters of consumer bankruptcy reform have estimated that only
7-11% of debtors might be excluded from Chapter 7 by the means
test.2 49 Nonetheless, in every Chapter 7 case, debtors will have to file
a detailed description of how the means test applies to them,2 50 and
the trustee must review every Chapter 7 case and file a statement
explaining whether the debtor passes or fails the means test. 25 1
One might wonder why Congress imposed the time- and
resource-intensive review of the complex means test on every case
when only about 10% of cases are expected to fail. Dutch reformers
expressed concern immediately about aspects of their system that
they feared might overburden actors in the system without a
commensurate return to creditors. 252 After trustees and courts
complained of a cost-benefit imbalance in certain labor-intensive
provisions of the new Dutch law, reformers recently proposed
amendments to reduce unnecessary complexity.2 53 One can only hope
that the Congress will respond similarly to the imminent entreaties
of overburdened trustees and courts who will now face a largely
pointless and unproductive paperwork review burden.
b. The Comparative Burdens On the Few Who Pay
Debtors who fail the means test in the United States will now be
relegated to mandatory five-year Chapter 13 payment plans if they
seek debt relief,254 and the means test provides the restricted
budgetary framework for such plans. A comparison of the budget
elements allowed to debtors under Dutch and U.S. law shows that the

(at least $166.67 per month), however, the means test denies access to Chapter 7
regardless of debt levels. Id.
249.
See, e.g., Zywicki, supra note 238 (noting that roughly 80% of filers earn
below their state's median income, and estimating that half of the remainder will be
unable to pay enough unsecured debt to fail the means test).
250.
11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(C) (as amended by Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 102(a)).
251.
Id. § 704(b)(1) (as amended by Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 102(c)). If the debtor
doesn't pass, the trustee must file a motion to dismiss the debtor's case or explain in a
written statement why a dismissal should not be imposed. Id. § 704(b)(2) (as amended
by Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 102(c)).
252.
Already in 1995 the First Chamber had expressed concerns about a
potential burden on the judiciary posed by the WSNP. See, e.g., Kamerstukken I
1995/96, 22 969, nr. 34a, p. 1; Kamerstukken I 1995/96, 22 969, nr. 34c, p. 2;
Kamerstukken I 1996/97, 22 969, nr. 133. The law passed only after measures were
taken to simplify the process. See Kamerstukken II 1997/98, 25 672, nr. 3, pp. 1-3;
Kamerstukken II 1997/98, 25 672, nr. 5, p. 8; Handelingen II 1997/98, nr. 61, p. 4571;
Kamerstukken I 1997/98, 22 969, nr. 297, pp. 4-5; Handelingen I 1997/98, 34, pp.
1740-41. The First Chamber remained concerned, however, about the burden on the
judiciary. See, e.g., Kamerstukken I 1997/98, 22 969, nr. 297b.
253.
Kamerstukken II 2004/05, 29 942, nr. 3, pp. 2, 6, 9. This proposal is
pending in the Second Chamber.
254.
11 U.S.C. § 1322(d) (as amended by Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 318(1)).
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U.S. law reduces at least some debtors to quite a minimal level of
existence.
If U.S. courts follow the example of their Dutch
counterparts, however, they can craft a more reasonable budget based
on the demands of each individual case.
Both U.S. and Dutch law allow for a baseline standard budget for
household expenses.
While Dutch law incorporates a uniform
national welfare level enacted by the legislature, 255 the U.S. law
incorporates a uniform national minimum budget designed and
implemented by federal taxing authorities. The Internal Revenue
Service (IRS) applies so-called "collection financial standards" in
evaluating compromise offers by taxpayers with arrearages, 25 6 and

one of these standards is a sliding scale of basic budgetary allowances
for debtors with increasing income levels and family sizes. The new
U.S. law adopts these IRS budgetary standards as the basis for
gauging payment ability in consumer bankruptcy cases. 25 7 Abovemedian income debtors seeking relief through a Chapter 13 payment
plan must now cede to creditors all income beyond the standard IRS
25 8
budget allowances.
For example, the 2005 baseline monthly budget for debtors who
earn $40,000-$50,000 per year 259 is $649 per month for singles, $857
for two-person households (e.g., single parents with one child), and
260
$1,002 for three-person households (e.g., couples with one child).
Similarly situated Dutch debtors (assuming all adult members of the
household were employed) would be budgeted about 50% more$1,000 per month for singles, $1,290 for single parents, and $1,500 for
working couples. 26 1 The IRS guidelines budget more to debtors with
higher incomes, but they allow a budget similar to the Dutch levels

255.
See supra notes 121-23 and accompanying text.
256.
These collection financial standards are amended annually and are
available on the IRS website, http://www.irs.gov/individuals/index.html
(follow
"Collection Financial Standards" hyperlink) (last visited Nov. 1, 2005).
257.
11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I) (as amended by Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 102(a)).
258.
See Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 102(h) (amending the definition of "disposable
income" in 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b) for above-median income debtors).
259.
This income is just above the 2005 median for 1- to 3-member households in
Louisiana, but not for 4-member households in Louisiana, and probably not even for
smaller households in more prosperous states. Recall that only above-median income
debtors are subject to this budget.
260.
See IRS Allowable Living Expenses, http://www.irs.gov/businesses/small/
article/0,,id= 104627,00.html.
261.
See supra notes 136-40 and accompanying text. The portion of the IRS
budget allocated for food and clothing (about 60% of the entire budget) can be increased
by 5% if "reasonable and necessary." 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I) (as amended by
Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 102(a)). But even then the figures would lie markedly below the
Dutch levels for similar debtors.
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only for debtors who earn more than $70,000 per year 2 62-not likely
members of the ranks of bankrupt debtors.
If legislators in the Netherlands felt that asking debtors to live
on the Dutch minimum income for more than three years was socially
irresponsible,26 3 one wonders how they would react to a required five
years on the significantly tighter U.S. budget. The contrast between
the Dutch and U.S. budget levels is striking and surprising. Most
observers (including this Author) would have thought that European
consumer bankruptcy laws required much more of "can pay" debtors
than the U.S. law, even after the reform, but this turns out to be
quite untrue.
On top of this baseline, both U.S. and Dutch law provide
additional budget allowances for other living expenses. 264 The IRS
guidelines allow for limited deductions for housing and utilities, as
well as transportation. The housing allowances vary by the county in
which the debtor lives and the number of occupants in the
dwelling, 265 and the transportation allowances vary by region and
metropolitan area. For example, in 2005, single debtors in New
Orleans (Orleans Parish) can spend up to $942 per month for housing
and utilities, while families of four or more can spend up to $1,274
per month. 266 Single debtors living just up the highway in rural
Bunkie (Avoyelles Parish), on the other hand, can only spend up to
$635 per month, and a family of four can spend only up to $860 per
month. 26 7
For transportation expenses, debtors throughout

262.
For 2005, the IRS monthly budgets for one-, two-, and three-member
households earning more than $70,000 per year are $953, $1,280, and $1,430,
respectively. See IRS Allowable Living Expenses, supra note 260.
263.
See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
264.
In addition to these housing and transportation allowances, only the U.S.
law allows for two other extraordinary expenses, although these are likely covered by
Dutch social welfare laws. U.S. debtors can add to their budgets the costs of caring for
elderly or disabled household members or members of their immediate family living
elsewhere, as well as up to $1,500 per year per child for private primary and secondary
education. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(II), (IV) (as amended by Pub. L. No. 109-8,
§ 102(a)). The Dutch medical system would undoubtedly provide for elder and disabled
care independently of the bankruptcy system, and the Dutch education system is
sufficiently supported by the state so as not to require resort to private schooling.
265.
Although not everyone agrees on this point, the new law appears to allow
for unlimited budget allowances for mortgage and secured car payments, as both of
Id.
these are secured debts that the means test allows to be paid in full.
§ 707(b)(2)(A)(iii) (as amended by Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 102(a)). This is perhaps the most
significant distinction between the U.S. and Dutch laws in general-U.S. law heavily
favors mortgagees and debtors with mortgages, while Dutch law essentially requires
sale of all mortgaged property, even if it produces a significant loss for both mortgage
creditors and debtors. See supra note 145.
266.
IRS, Louisiana-Housing and Utilities Allowable Living Expenses,
http://www.irs.govfbusinesses/small/article/O,,id=104796,00.html (last visited Nov. 1,
2005).
267.
Id.
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Louisiana can spend up to $242 per month on gas and maintenance
for one car in 2005.268
These IRS housing and transportation allowances are somewhat
more generous than the Dutch equivalents, but in most cases, the
amounts are not generous enough to make up for the substantially
smaller U.S. baseline budget discussed above.
Debtors in the
Netherlands are expected to cover the first approximately $220 of
housing expenses from their baseline budgets, and the law provides
extra budget allocations for expenses beyond this low level. Although
the Dutch law technically offers only a very limited additional
housing allowance (about $280 for rent and utilities beyond the initial
$220), courts generally allow for full housing expenses for debtors
unable to relocate to low-cost housing, along with up to about $180
26 9
per month for necessary car transportation.
For those few above-median-income U.S. debtors whom the new
"means test" pushes into payment plans, the new law apparently goes
even farther than the Dutch law in extracting as much value as
possible from future income and pushing debtors into a subsistence
(perhaps even sub-subsistence) lifestyle. Judging by years of Dutch
experience with payment plans, 270 very few U.S. debtors will be able
to manage through five years of living on the meager IRS budget, and
these debtors might therefore ultimately be denied relief. If, as can
be predicted, the budget-restricted plans of the new law fail as often
as Chapter 13 plans do under current law, 2 71 one would hope that
Congress would at least abandon the mandatory five-year period and
replace it with the Dutch standard of three years.
c. Saved by the Judge?
There may be a light at the end of this dark tunnel for the few
debtors compelled into apparently unworkable payment plans under
the new law. Dutch experience suggests that judges might not stand
by and watch as honest debtors are denied relief by overly stringent
requirements. The Dutch law allows courts to add extra budget
allowances at their discretion, and the exercise of this discretion
produced a substantially more flexible and generous budget system
for Dutch debtors than the law seemed to prescribe. 2 72 Likewise in
the United States, the new law contains a "pressure valve" provision

268.
IRS, Allowable Living Expenses for Transportation, http://www.irs.gov/
businessessmall]articleO,,id=104623,00.html (last visited Nov. 1, 2005).
Debtors
without cars can spend up to $197 per month on public transportation, and debtors
with two cars can spend up to $336 per month. Id.
269.
See supra notes 145-46 and accompanying text.
270.
See supranotes 158-60 and accompanying text.
271.
See supranote 28 and accompanying text (reporting a 66% failure rate).
272.
See supranotes 124, 129-47 and accompanying text.
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that allows courts to increase the debtor's budget for "special
circumstances." 273 One would hope that U.S. courts would follow the
example of their Dutch counterparts in exercising their statutory
discretion to impose balanced, reasonable, and realistic budgetary
demands based on debtors' individual circumstances, regardless of
the budgets the IRS suggests ought to suffice for all debtors.

IV.

CONCLUSION

Who would have thought that such distant and different
countries as the United States and the Netherlands would arrive
independently at virtually the same system of consumer debt relief?.
On the other hand, perhaps this is simply evidence of the logical
result of economic and legal globalization.
Modern democratic
economies can be expected to face similar challenges and to converge
on similar solutions. As a flood of liberalized credit was loosed on
U.S. and Dutch consumers, debtors in both countries faced similar
household financial crises that posed similar social and economic
problems for our societies.
While the legal responses to these
problems started in different places in the United States and the
Netherlands, perhaps it is little wonder that they ultimately arrived
at largely the same point.
The U.S. backlash against liberal consumer bankruptcy policies
seems to have overshot the area of convergence, though. This
examination of Dutch practice has suggested a few areas in particular
where the U.S. reform seems to have overcorrected. Indeed, the
Dutch law is no model of perfection either as the political process is
sometimes understandably unable to deal directly and effectively
with the complex problems of financially overextended consumers.
Luckily, the Dutch and U.S. laws contain flex points that allow
courts to stretch the law to fit the changing demands of varying cases.
More now than ever, the future of U.S. consumer bankruptcy policy
rests in the hands of the good people in black robes behind the bench.
Let us hope that they will be more receptive to foreign influence and
seize the opportunity to learn from the mistakes and successes of our
friends in Europe. Globalization should be a two-way street.

273.
11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(2)-(3) (incorporating 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2) into the
definition of "disposable income").

